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Abstract
Fiber optic technology is an important part of communication networks enabling highbandwidth transmissions over long and short distances. They do have their fair share of
problems though, contamination being the biggest culprit. Contamination of fiber optic
connectors can lead to serious performance degradation or even loss of signal. Detecting
contaminated fiber connectors can take weeks or even months using traditional practices.
There are standard cleanliness practices when dealing with optical connectors but still
the problem seems to persist. This work presents an inequality to solve the detection
portion of this problem. The proposed inequality uses power readings from the Small
Form-Factor Pluggables’ (SFPs) Digital Optical Monitoring (DOM) capabilities to detect
if the contamination is affecting the optical signal. The inequality proposed also takes into
account the tolerance range of the optical power readings, the suggested tolerance is ± 3
dB but this work shows that in practice it is much closer to ± 1 dB. The inequality is used
to detect contaminated connectors in an experiment where power samples are collected
over a day and is able to detect them with no false positives. A top-down approach is
also taken to detect contaminated fiber connectors using higher layer event counters such
as TCP retransmissions. After several trials using the top-down method, the results are
inconclusive. Further work is needed to detect contaminated connectors using this method.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Communication networks are vital to how humans communicate, it is the foundation of
the Internet. Reliable communication is necessary to help society progress. All types of
networks rely on optical networks, not necessarily in their local network but there are many
used for long-haul transmissions to connect to the Internet. The motivation for this work
is to help alleviate some of the burdens of managing optical networks. Managing large
scale optical networks can prove to be difficult which is why there is a trend in ongoing
research to automate network management [2]. The steps towards automation are heavily
influenced by machine learning and statistical methods to help network managers detect
faults and correct for them in their networks. There are other pursuits to make network
management easier as well, Software Defined Networking (SDN) is a new technology to
help network managers configure and monitor their networks with tools like OpenFlow [3]
[4]. SDN uses controllers to configure and monitor the network by communicating with
switches that are OpenFlow (or similar protocol) enabled. SDN is based on the premise of
splitting up the network into a data plane and control plane, the data plane is where all
the user traffic goes through and the control plane handles all the control traffic sent to
and from the controllers as shown in Figure 1.1.
The network manager is responsible for all the users and data that runs through that
network. This can prove to be a daunting task as there can be many users using many
devices all using the network at the same time. This is why network management has
proven to be difficult, there are so many factors that could affect networks of all sizes
and the network manager has to keep a watchful eye out for anything that could pose a
threat to the integrity of the network. This includes trying to prevent issues before they

1

Figure 1.1: Small SDN network
happen, which tends to be difficult in a system with many random variables. As network
size increases it becomes more difficult to manage. The classical FCAPS model, as shown
in Figure 1.2 describes what a network manager’s responsibilities are: fault detection,
configuration, accounting/billing, performance assurance and security of the network.
Each one of these responsibilities is a task on their own but this work will look at
the fault detection portion of the FCAPS model. There are two types of failures, hardfailures, and soft-failures. Hard-hard failures are when the component or service in question
completely fails, such as a broken link. Soft-failures are when the component or service
does not see complete failure but a reduction in performance or stability. Table 1.1 shows
examples of each type of failure.
Contaminated fiber connectors can cause both types of failures, both soft and hard.
2

Figure 1.2: FCAPS model for network management
This has proven to be a frequent problem as most major network service providers estimate
that over 70% of optical network troubleshooting is due to contaminated connectors [5].
Contamination of the optical connectors causes signal degradation which can lead to more
bit errors or even complete link failure. On a large network, it is unfeasible to expend
enough manpower to inspect the connectors by hand. Even on a smaller network, it is
better to allocate resources elsewhere if possible. To try to detect this problem and allow
the manager to prevent any possible failure is what this work aims to accomplish. The

Table 1.1: Soft vs Hard Failures
Soft-Failures

Hard-Failures

Increased Bit Error Rate (BER)

Cut wire

TCP misconfiguration

Loss of Signal (LoS)

Slow throughput

Server down

3

physical nature of this work means there are limitations of the resources available. There
was no access to a large network to validate the method due to the unwillingness of any
network manager to accept.
This work proposes an inequality to detect contamination that affects optical power.
The inequality allows for detection without any added hardware. Experiments were conducted to validate this inequality by collecting optical power samples from the Small FormFactor Pluggables’ (SFPs) Digital Optical Monitoring (DOM) capabilities. The inequality
is heavily reliant on the tolerance range of the SFP power measurements thus experiments
were conducted to determine if the measurements from the SFP are accurate enough to
detect contaminated optical connectors with certainty. This work also investigated using a
top-down approach to detect symptoms of contaminated optical connectors higher in the
data stack. This involved collecting many non-physical layer statistics, a list of all statistics collected can be found in Appendix A. The statistics with the most variance, TCP
retransmissions and TCP delayed acknowledgments, were chosen as inputs for a K-Nearest
Neighbors (KNN) and decision tree models to label new optical power samples as either
clean or contaminated.

1.1

Outline of this Thesis

Chapter 2 describes related topics on fiber-optic communications, with information about
gigabit Ethernet optical standards, transmitter and receiver technology, cabling information, Small Form-Factor Pluggables (SFPs), modulation techniques, typical loss measurements and more. Information about data analysis which includes machine learning, data
mining, and general techniques when analyzing data is also included. Chapter 2 covers
related literature about contamination of optical connectors and fault/anomaly detection.
Chapter 3 describes the experiments conducted for this research and what they aim to
accomplish. This includes information about the topology of the test network, the data
collected, the method to collect the data and all the logistics of how the experiment was

4

conducted.
Chapter 4 describes the results of the experiments described in Chapter 3. A formulation of an inequality to detect contaminated optical connectors, which is the main objective
of this research, is discussed. The inequality is then verified on the data collected from the
experiments. Chapter 4 also discusses the true tolerance range of SFP power measurements. Finally, Chapter 4 discusses the top-down approach to detecting contaminated
fiber connector symptoms using higher layer statistics.
Chapter 5 contains the conclusions of this work and discusses future work.

5

Chapter 2
Fiber Optic Communications
2.1

Single-Mode Fiber (SMF) vs Multi-Mode Fiber
(MMF)

Single-mode and multi-mode fiber cables allow for high-speed data transfers by being the
medium through which optical transmitters and receivers, i.e lasers and photodiodes, communicate. The main difference between the single-mode and multi-mode fiber is the transmitter type and the diameter of the core.
Single-mode fiber has a core diameter of 9 µm as shown in Figure 2.1 and only has
one mode/path of light as shown in Figure 2.2. Single-mode fiber operates within the
wavelengths of 1310 nm and 1550 nm which gives less attenuation per meter. Due to these
properties, single-mode fiber is ideal for long-distance data transmissions.

Figure 2.1: Core to cladding ratio of single-mode fiber cables
The diameter core of multi-mode fiber is usually 50 µm or 62.5 µm as shown in Figure
2.3 which has a much wider core diameter than it’s single-mode counterpart. Having a
much larger core diameter allows surface emitting lasers to couple nicely with these cables

6

Figure 2.2: Single-mode light path
allowing many more paths/modes of light as shown in Figure 2.4, hence the name multimode. Having a large core diameter and multiple modes of light causes higher attenuation
per meter which is why multi-mode fiber is usually restricted to short-haul transmissions.

Figure 2.3: Core to cladding ratio of multi-mode fiber cables

Figure 2.4: Multi-mode light paths

2.1.1

Transmitters and Receivers

There are two main types of lasers used for high bandwidth fiber optic communications,
surface emitting lasers and edge-emitting lasers as shown in Figure 2.5. Surface emitting
lasers generate light that leaves the device surface at a perpendicular angle, as where edge

7

a) Surface Emitting Laser

b) Edge Emitting Laser

Figure 2.5: Transmitters
emitting lasers generate light that leaves the device at an angle parallel to the surface. The
most commonly used type of surface emitting lasers are Vertical-Cavity Surface-Emitting
Lasers (VCSELs)[6]. VCSELs are good for high bandwidth short-haul transmissions due
to the output optical signal having a short wavelength generally, 850 nm [7]. VCSELs are
made using 2 different Bragg reflectors with an active region in the middle, the commonly
used materials for the reflectors are GaAs and AlGaAs. The most commonly used type
of edge emitting lasers is Fabry-Pérot lasers (FP Lasers). FP lasers are generally used for
long-haul transmissions due to being able to produce high power long wavelength optical
signals, which are essential for communication over long distances. This is achieved by
using two highly reflective and slightly transmitting parallel mirrors, the concept stems
from the Fabry-Pérot resonator but is applied to lasers for optical communication, thus
receiving the name Fabry-Pérot lasers [8]. Those are the two main types of transmitters
used for gigabit optical networking but there are other transmitter technologies used such
as Distributed FeedBack (DFB) lasers/Directly Modulated Lasers (DMLs) and Electroabsorption Modulated Lasers (EMLs).
Photodiodes are used for fiber optic communication receivers. However, depending
on the wavelength of the optical signal of the transmitter, the photodiode must be made
of different materials. The materials affect the wavelength at which the photodiode is the
most sensitive. The materials for the single-mode and multi-mode receivers are strategically
8

selected differently to have higher sensitivity at the appropriate transmitter wavelength.
For multi-mode wavelength (850 nm) a simple silicon photodiode is used. For single-mode
wavelengths (1310/1510 nm) more sensitive devices need to be used, thus the common
receiver to use is a InGaAs based photodiode, the reason that this material is used over
Ge is that it can provide a better signal quality, i.e produces less noise. There are also
avalanche photodiodes (APDs) that are commonly used for long-haul communications.
APDs are used because they can reach higher sensitivity due to their built-in gain [9].
However, since the whole signal gets amplified it is essential that it has a high signal to
noise ratio.

2.2

Small Form-Factor Pluggables (SFPs)

Figure 2.6: Small Form-Factor Pluggable
Small form-factor pluggables, as shown in Figure 2.6, are critical to transfer data in
optical networks due to their plug-and-play nature and reliability to transfer data at high
speeds. SFPs are modular devices that plug into other networking equipment such as
9

switches and optical taps. SFPs for optical communications contain the appropriate transmitters and receivers according to certain standards. Switch manufacturers will produce
switches with numerous SFP ports rather than hardwired transceivers due to the modularity and flexibility it adds to their devices. SFPs come in many different forms which
gives the user control of their network, letting them choose the bitrate, connector type, and
standards the SFP adheres to. SFP builds are regulated by three standards:
• SFF-8472 [10]
• SFP Multi-Source Agreement (MSA) [11]
• IEEE 802.3 Ethernet Standard [12]
The SFF-8472 was created by the Small Form-Factor Committee, now known as the
Storage Networking Industry Association (SNIA), was made for the purpose of standardizing what information the SFPs should collect, how the data should be represented and
giving tolerance ranges for certain statistics. The SFP MSA standardizes the physical aspects of the SFPs such as the dimensions of the unit, timing requirements of the I/O and
the pin layout on the PCB. The IEEE standards are in the 802.3 Ethernet document [12],
this describes the physical requirements of the SFP transmitter and receiver in the PMD
portion of each particular standard.

2.3

Cables and Connectors

There are many different cable types and connectors available. A few notable examples
are the Subscriber Connector (SC), the Lucent Connector (LC), the Straight Tip (ST) and
the Ferrule Connector (FC) as shown in Figure 2.7. Of the list, only the LC connector has
a 1.25 mm ferrule as shown in Figure 2.8. The rest of the connections all have 2.5 mm
ferrules.
Each of these connectors differs in cost and reliability so the ideal connector depends
on the use case. These connectors can all have different polishes, which is the way that
10

Figure 2.7: Fiber-optic connectors [1]

a) Lucent Connector

b) Subscriber Connector

Figure 2.8: LC and SC Connectors
the ferrule is shaped. There are 3 types of polishes, Physical Contact (PC), Ultra Physical
Contact (UPC) and Angled Physical Contact (APC). Having a PC polish means that only
the cores will come into contact, UPC will also only have the cores contact but with greater
precision and the APC will angle the connector. This is done to reduce return loss caused
11

by the connectors, so depending on the requirements of the channel it may be ideal to
choose a polish that will minimize return loss.
SFPs contain sub-assemblies for both the transmitter and receiver. There are three
different types of sub-assemblies, Transmitter Optical Sub-Assembly (TOSA), Receiver
Optical Sub-Assembly (ROSA) and Bi-directional Optical Sub-Assembly (BOSA). The
TOSA and ROSA contain the hardware pertinent to the transmitter or receiver respectively
or in the case of the BOSA both. The TOSA will contain the laser diode, any type of lenses
necessary, along with any other add-ons the manufacturer wants to add, such as photodiode
monitors. The ROSA is similar, it contains the photodiode, along with lenses and add-ons.
The BOSA is a combination of both, by using Wave Division Multiplexing (WDM) on one
fiber. The BOSA is not popular as it is much more cost effective to have the TOSA and
ROSA separate and use two separate fibers.

2.4

Modulation

Optical transmitters in SFPs use Pulse Amplitude Modulation with two levels (PAM-2),
meaning that each unique bit will be represented by one of two power levels as shown
in Figure 2.9. The received optical signal is shown in Figure 2.10, where there is a time
shift due (τ ) to propagation delay and attenuation (δ). This is the signal the photodiode will detect and convert into an amplified (α) electrical signal (V) to be used by the
serializer/deserializer, as shown in Figure 2.11.
Modulation is accomplished by using a driver circuit to modulate the laser, as shown
in Figure 2.12. The driver uses the inputs produced by the Physical Medium Attachment
(PMA) sublayer which are the serialized bits of the 10-bit codewords produced by the
Physical Coding Sublayer (PCS). The 8b/10b encoding is essential for optimal performance
of the transmitter, receiver and cables.
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Figure 2.9: Transmitted optical signal using PAM-2

2.5

Loss Measurements

The two categories of loss in fiber optic communications are insertion loss and return loss.

2.5.1

Insertion Loss (IL)

Insertion loss is the ratio of power transmitted over the power received. This is usually
measured in decibels, thus the equation for insertion loss is given by:


IL = 10 log10

T x P ower
Rx P ower



(2.1)

This measurement is useful as it will not only include the natural power attenuation
from distance and passive components but also the power loss due to contamination.
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Figure 2.10: Receiver optical signal using PAM-2

2.5.2

Return Loss (RL)

Return loss is the ratio of power incident to the power reflected back at a surface, where
the surface is fiber optic connector end-faces. This is also usually measured in decibels,
thus the equation is given by:

RL = 10 log10

T x P ower
Ref lected P ower

!

(2.2)

The power reflected back can be computed by using Fresnel’s laws of reflections. Where
P is the reflection coefficient from the case where the electric field is parallel to the surface
and S is the reflection coefficient from the case where the electric field is perpendicular to
the surface. Where P and S are given by:
q

P =

−n22 cosθi + n1 (n22 − n21 sin2 θi )
q

n22 cosθi + n1 (n22 − n21 sin2 θi )
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(2.3)

Figure 2.11: Electrical signal after being amplified/quantized

Figure 2.12: Driver taking multiple inputs to drive a laser diode

S=

n1 cosθi −

q

n1 cosθi +

q

(n22 − n21 sin2 θi )

(n22 − n21 sin2 θi )

(2.4)

However in the special case where the angle of incidence is normal to the surface of
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where the refractive index changes then Equation 2.3 can be simplified to,
S=

n1 − n2
n1 + n2

(2.5)

Where the power reflected back is the square of S, if there is no parallel polarization.
n1 − n2
P ower Ref lected =
n1 + n2


2

(2.6)

P = 0 can be achieved by using Brewster’s angle which is given by:
θB = tan−1

n2
n1

(2.7)

Figure 2.13: Return loss caused when light travels through media with different
refractive indexes
This is a useful measurement when looking at the effect of contamination on optical
performance due to the contaminants having a refractive index that will reflect some of
the power back and cause power loss. Return Loss and Optical Return Loss (ORL) are
interchangeable terms.

2.6

Optical Gigabit Ethernet Standards

Gigabit optical networking has two common standards which are 1000BASE-SX and
1000BASE-LX, which are both standards that are described in the IEEE 802.3 Ethernet standard [12]. Both of these standards are derivatives of the 1000BASE-X standard
which is also described in the Ethernet 802.3 standard. The functionality of the devices
that adhere to the aforementioned standards can be separated into 3 different sections,
the Physical Coding Sublayer (PCS), the Physical Medium Attachment (PMA) and the
16

Physical Medium Dependent (PMD). Figure 2.14 shows the extension of the physical layer
of the typical 5-layer OSI model to show the 3 sublayers.

Figure 2.14: Extended OSI model to show sublayers
Both the PCS and PMA are the same for 1000BASE-SX and 1000BASE-LX standards
which are identical to that of the 1000BASE-X specifications, however they do differ in
PMD specifications due to having different requirements in the 802.3 standard as shown in
Table 2.1. The average launch power is the average power of the optical signal produced
by the transmitter. The average receive power is the average power of the optical signal
detected by the photodiode. The receiver sensitivity is the minimum amount of power that
17

Table 2.1: 1000BASE-SX vs 1000BASE-LX PMD Characteristics, from Ethernet
Standards
1000BASE-SX

1000BASE-LX

Units

Transmitter Wavelength

770 to 860

1270 to 1355

nm

Range (Max)

550

5000

m

Average Launch Power (Max)

0

-3

dBm

Average Launch Power (Min)

-9.5

-11.5 to -11a

dBm

Average Receive Power (Max) 0

-3

dBm

Receiver Sensitivity

-17

-19

dBm

Stressed Receiver Sensitivity

-12.5 to -13.5a

-14.4

dBm

Return Loss (Min)

12

12

dB

RMS Spectral Width (max)

0.85

4

nm

a

Depending on the type of cable and wavelength used.

needs to be detected by the receiver to function correctly. Similarly the stressed receiver
sensitivity is the power that is needed for the receiver to operate correctly under heavy
loads. The spectral width is the span of the spectrum of light that is emitted from the
transmitter.

2.6.1

Physical Medium Dependent (PMD)

The PMD portion of the physical layer, when using optical connectors, is responsible for
interfacing optical signals with an electrical interface. The PMD will turn the stream of
bits represented by an electrical signal and use a driver to produce the appropriate optical
signal through the laser transmitter. There are different types of transmitter technologies
that can be used depending on the standard. The two main types are surface emitting
lasers and edge emitting lasers. The PMD will also produce an electrical signal based on
received optical signal through use of a photodiode. Generally this is put through a pre18

amplifier as well as a quantizer to create a stream of bits that were received. Figure 2.15
shows an example of a 1-bit resolution quantizer, in the case of fiber optic communications
the input would be the output from the photodiode. The quantizer will transform the input
signal from the photodiode into a higher and lower power to represent the bits which will
be deserialized by the PMA into 10-bit codewords. This is usually all contained within the
SFP as shown in Figure 2.16, which shows the flow of bits from the transceiver to Layer 2.

Figure 2.15: Quantizer example, where the input signal would be the electrical signal
produced by the optical receiver i.e photodiode

2.6.2

Physical Medium Attachment (PMA)

The Physical Medium Attachment (PMA) is responsible for providing an interface between
the Physical Medium Dependent (PMD) and the Physical Coding Sublayer (PCS). This is
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Figure 2.16: Flow of bits from optical signal to 8-bit bytes usable by Ethernet
to provide a layer of abstraction so that the PCS can interface with any PMD, which is
accomplished by using a Media Dependent Interface (MDI) to exchange data between the
PMA and the PMD. Thus the responsibilities that the PMA have are: serialization of the
10-bit characters received from the PCS, deserialization of the bits provided by the PMD
into 10-bit characters, clock recovery from the 10-bit characters and data loopback. This is
done using an 8b/10b SerDes IC along with protocol ICs and Programmable Logic Devices
(PLDs) that allow for other statistics such as optical power levels through Digital Optical
Monitoring (DOM) and Loss of Signal (LoS) to be reported.

2.6.3

Physical Coding Sublayer (PCS)

The PCS portion of the physical layer is responsible for interfacing the PMA with the
Gigabit Media Independent Interface (GMII). It encodes GMII data octets into 8b/10b
code groups to be used by the PMA and decodes 8b/10b code groups into GMII data
octets to be used by layer 2. It is also in charge of handling collision detection and autonegotiation.
8b/10b is a line coding scheme that will take 8-bit bytes from the Layer 2 and will
encode them into 10-bit codewords. The purpose of doing this is to achieve a DC balance,
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i.e send the same amount of 1’s as 0’s. It also helps with clock recovery by ensuring that
there are enough transitions. It splits the 8-bits into 5-bit and 3-bit groups then appends
an extra bit at the end of the corresponding group. The tables for encoding/decoding are
shown in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 along with the special codewords shown in Table 2.4. The
output is depending on the running disparity which is given by (number of 1s sent - number
of 0s sent), which starts by default at -1.
Table 2.2: 5b to 6b Encoding

Code Group

Input Bits

IF RD = -1

IF RD = 1

D.00

00000

100111

011000

D.01

00001

011101

100010

D.02

00010

101101

010010

D.03

00011

110001

110001

D.04

00100

110101

001010

D.05

00101

101001

101001

D.06

00110

011001

011001

D.07

00111

111000

000111

D.08

01000

111001

000110

D.09

01001

100101

100101

D.10

01010

010101

010101

D.11

01011

110100

110100

D.12

01100

001101

001101

D.13

01101

101100

101100

D.14

01110

011100

011100

D.15

01111

010111

101000

D.16

10000

011011

100100

D.17

10001

100011

100011
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Table 2.2: 5b to 6b Encoding

Code Group

Input Bits

IF RD = -1

IF RD = 1

D.18

10010

010011

010011

D.19

10011

110010

110010

D.20

10100

001011

001011

D.21

10101

101010

101010

D.22

10110

011010

011010

D.23

10111

111010

000101

D.24

11000

110011

001100

D.25

11001

100110

100110

D.26

11010

010110

010110

D.27

11011

110110

001001

D.28

11100

001110

001110

D.29

11101

101110

010001

D.30

11110

011110

100001

D.31

11111

101011

010100

K.28

11100

001111

110000

Table 2.3: 3b to 4b Encoding

Code

Input Bits

IF RD = -1

IF RD = 1

D.x.0

000

0100

1011

D.x.1

001

1001

1001

D.x.2

010

0101

0101

D.x.3

011

0011

1100

Group
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Table 2.3: 3b to 4b Encoding

Code

Input Bits

IF RD = -1

IF RD = 1

D.x.4

100

0010

1101

D.x.5

101

1010

1010

D.x.6

110

0110

0110

D.x.P7

111

0001

1110

D.x.A7

111

1000

0111

K.x.0

000

0100

1011

K.x.1

001

1001

0110

K.x.2

010

0101

1010

K.x.3

011

0011

1100

K.x.4

100

0010

1101

K.x.5

101

1010

0101

K.x.6

110

0110

1001

K.x.7

111

1000

0111

Group

Table 2.4: Special 8b/10b Codewords

Code Group

Input Bits

IF RD = -1

IF RD = 1

K.28.0

000 11100

001111 0100

110000 1011

K.28.1

001 11100

001111 1001

110000 0110

K.28.2

010 11100

001111 0101

110000 1010

K.28.3

011 11100

001111 0011

110000 1100

K.28.4

100 11100

001111 0010

110000 1101

K.28.5

101 11100

001111 1010

110000 0101
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Table 2.4: Special 8b/10b Codewords

2.6.4

Code Group

Input Bits

IF RD = -1

IF RD = 1

K.28.6

110 11100

001111 0110

110000 1001

K.28.7

111 11100

001111 1000

110000 0111

K.23.7

111 10111

111010 1000

000101 0111

K.27.7

111 11011

110110 1000

001001 0111

K.29.7

111 11101

101110 1000

010001 0111

K.30.7

111 11110

011110 1000

100001 0111

1000BASE-SX

SX means that it uses a short wavelength laser, between 770 nm to 860 nm, to transmit
optical signals across the physical medium, i.e fiber cables. The most popular laser technology for short-wavelength/multi-mode fiber is surface-emitting lasers such as Vertical-Cavity
Surface-Emitting Lasers (VCSELs), however other laser technologies can be used if they
meet the specifications in the 802.3 standard. The reason for using this technology is that
it has a small enough emission area to couple well with multi-mode fiber cables which have
a core diameter of either 50 microns or 62.5 microns. This technology is used for data
transmission along shorter distances, rated for 550 meters using the correct cables. The
receiver is a photodiode that can detect the appropriate wavelength, in this case being 770
to 860 nm.

2.6.5

1000BASE-LX

LX means that it uses a long wavelength laser, between 1270 nm and 1355 nm, to transmit
optical signals across the physical medium. The most popular laser technology for long
wavelength/single-mode fiber is edge-emitting lasers such as the Fabry-Pérot lasers (FP
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Lasers). Since surface-emitting laser technologies have too large of an emission area to
be coupled with the smaller 9 micron core diameter of single-mode fiber, edge-emitting
technologies must be used to couple efficiently allowing for longer transmission distances.
Longer wavelengths are ideal for transmitting longer distances, which is why 1000BASE-LX
is rated for a transmission distance of 5 kilometers using the correct cables. The receiver is
a photodiode that can detect the appropriate wavelength, in this case being 1270 to 1355
nm.

2.7

Contaminated Fiber Connectors

Contamination of fiber optic connectors can present issues in a network due by causing
insertion loss, which includes return loss. The contaminants will generally have a different
refractive index than the fiber causing some return loss. Contamination will also cause
insertion loss by blocking light from coupling into the core of the fiber connector. Misalignment of connectors is also a culprit of optical signal degradation, which can be caused
by either tilting or offsetting the connectors. Tilt is when the connectors do not form a
180 angle when mated. This can happen due to contamination residing in between two
connectors causing them to not form a perfect flat connection. Offset is when they are not
aligned in space and can also be caused by contamination residing between the bottom, top
or sides of a connector. These scenarios are illustrated by Figure 2.17. All of these factors
cause the signal quality to be degraded which can cause bit errors, which the following appropriate action Ethernet takes is to drop the frame. If there are many bit errors then the
performance of the optical network will be severely affected and possibly cause complete
link failure.
There was no literature that was directly related with the detection of contaminated
fiber connectors in a network, however there has been work done in analyzing optical performance degradation due to contamination of the connectors, as well as anomaly detection
within a network.
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a) Good connection

b) Misalignment due to tilt

c) Misalignment due to offset

Figure 2.17: Connection Misalignment

2.7.1

Contamination’s effect on optical performance

[13] presents an experimental study that provides insight into how fiber connector contamination and scratches affect optical signal performance. In their experiments Insertion loss
(IL), optical return loss (ORL) and bit error rate (BER) were observed. These experiments
used standard connector (SC) simplex single mode fiber at a rate of 10 Gbps and a variable
attenuator. The procedure they followed was to clean, contaminate/scratch, then visually
inspect and run performance tests. For carbon particle contamination, IL was increased
by up to ten times, return loss was decreased by 2 to 3 times and the bit error rate was
increased by 2 to 10 times. Particles have little to no effect if they are not located near
the core and oil contamination has no effect on insertion loss due to it having a similar
refractive index as the fiber material used. Oil has a large effect on return loss and carbon
particle contamination has a large effect on the bit error rate.
[14] presented a slightly more extensive experimental study to analyze the effects of
both incorrectly cleaved fiber ends and fiber connector contamination on optical signal
performance. This study also used SC connectors. Incorrectly cleaved fiber ends can cause
IL over 40 dB and ORL under 30 dB. The effect of fiber connector contamination are:
• Light blocking caused by contamination on the core can cause IL upwards of 7dB and
can cause ORL to reduce depending on the refractive index of the contamination at
80% coverage.
• A 50 µm gap caused by contamination resulted in up to 1 dB of IL.
• Misalignment due to tilt caused by contamination resulted in IL upwards of 1.4 dB
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at a 3 degree tilt.
• Misalignment due to offset caused by contamination resulted in IL upwards of 1.9 dB
at a 3µm offset.
[15] developed cleanliness standards for single mode connectors. SC/FC connectors
which are 2.5 mm in diameter and LC/MU connectors which are 1.25 mm in diameter.
The most critical region was found to be the core area, which is the area within 25µm of
the core. Contamination has the greatest effect on optical performance if located within
this critical region. Each connector type was contaminated with Arizona dust and used a
pass-fail system to test optical performance. The test subject had to fall within 3 times
the Standard Deviation (SD) of the clean connector for both IL and ORL to pass. 2.5
mm ferrules were more resistant to particle movement due to mating/de-mating. 60% of
the LC/MU connectors saw an increase of IL between 0.5 dB and 1.1 dB as a result of
contamination and particle migration.
[16] showed that the primary source of contamination was due to the dust caps that
the cables were shipped with. A suggestion was made to use a different material to help
reduce the likelihood of contamination due to dust caps. Optical performance was tested
to analyze the effects of the dust cap contamination. The results showed that the BER
was 100 times larger and could even cause complete failure when the core of the fiber optic
cable was blocked/contaminated.
[17] presented an experimental study of the effect of Arizona dust contamination on
small form-factor pluggable (SFP) transceiver receptacles. Initially this study observed
Optical Power, Pulse Mask Margin, Spectral Width and Optical Return Loss (ORL) however it was found that only ORL was being affected by the contamination and therefore that
is the only parameter that was studied further. The contamination of the receptacles and
single-mode fiber showed a common trend where the distance of the nearest contamination
particle from the core correlated to ORL. The closer to the core the higher the difference
in ORL was which could be as high as a 20-30 dB difference.
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[18] analyzed the effects on short reach 10 Gb/s SFP+ transceivers which differ from
other lower bandwidth transceivers because they have lensed receptacles rather than fiber
stub interfaces. The lenses of the Optical Sub-Assemblies (OSAs) were contaminated using
SiO2 test dust, which was followed by 10 samples of the transmitted and received power.
The results showed that the contamination had an extreme effect on 5 of the 10 samples
and that the maximum difference between the Tx power and Rx power were 1.24 dBm
and 1.15 dBm respectively. The results from the physical experiment were compared with
simulated results using the ZEMAX software. The results of both the physical and simulated experiments were near identical, verifying that the contamination is having a negative
effect on optical performance.
[5] study showed that there is a correlation between contamination and signal degradation in single-mode APC connectors. The experiments conducted involved 25 APC singlemode connectors that were mated and de-mated to analyze the effects of particle migration
and contamination on optical connectors. It was found that if there is contamination found
within the core there was significant RL reduction, an average of 14.2 dB. However, if there
was only contamination outside the core area then there was little to no RL issues. In these
experiments particle migration is most prevalent with particles < 5 microns. This study
also showed that scratches have no effect on APC connectors even though scratches are
known to cause a noticeable RL decrease in UPC single-mode connectors. It is also stated
in this work that most major network service providers estimate that over 70% of optical
network troubleshooting is due to contaminated connectors.
[19] conducted experiments to see the effect of contamination, particularly in aerospace
applications, on single mode fiber. They conducted tests using different connectors such
as butt connectors and several expanded beam connector types. They contaminated each
type of connector with either water, potassium formate, Clearway3, Hyjet V, brake dust
and a mixture of Hyjet V and brake dust. Results showed that there was little to no loss, <
0.2 dB on clean butt connectors, and there was slightly more in the expanded beam types
due to extra optics. The contamination degraded the performance differently depending on
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the type of contaminant, where the worst case being brake dust on the butt connector with
a loss of 83 dB. Insertion loss went up in all cases where a contaminant was introduced to
the core area of the cables.
[20] conducted experiments where they used a cassette cleaning tape to clean connectors
and placed them near metallic particles to demonstrate how electrostatic charge can be a
catalyst for attracting contamination. Another source of contamination that was explored
in this study the PVC dust caps that are used to cover the cables when not in use. The
cables were covered with PVC dust caps that were contaminated with metallic particles
and the results showed that the cables became contaminated over time, reaching peak
contamination after 7 days. This study shows that not only dust can impact a network but
any particle that obstructs the light path.
[21] used an analytic model to estimate the Return Loss (RL) on scratched optical
fiber end faces based on size, location and relative reflectivity. The model produced used
a new parameter introduced in this paper called relative reflectivity, which is described as
the ratio between the reflectivity of a scratch compared to the reflectivity of an end-face
with no defects. Using this particular model the RL induced by the scratch was accurately
predicted within ±1 dB.
Not only does contamination of fiber connectors degrade network performance but it
can also damage the hardware itself. [22] conducted a study to find a correlation between
damage to connectors and IL/RL, contamination location and power loss. If the IL and
RL measurements do not meet the standards of > 0.5 dB and < 45 dB respectively, then it
is likely that the connector will be damaged during high power transmission. The particle
location also had a significant impact on the connector being damaged if the particles
overlapped most of the core. It was found that if power loss exceeded 0.22 dB then the
connector would likely be damaged in a high-power system. This study also showed that
cleaning the connectors with both an air duster and optical connection cleaner was more
effective than using just one method alone.

29

Table 2.5: Anomaly Detection
Statistical

Machine Learning

Data Mining

Descriptive

System call based sequence analysis

Clustering

Signature

Bayesian networks

Fuzzy logic

Anomaly score

Principle component analysis (PCA)

Association rule mining

Hotellings Tˆ2 test

Neural networks

K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN)

Markov chains

Support Vector Machines (SVM)

2.7.2

Fault/Anomaly Detection

[23] gives an overview of modern anomaly detection techniques. The techniques can be
split up into 3 different sets: statistical, machine learning and data mining. Each set has
pros and cons. Statistical techniques have the advantage of not needing any training data
of anomalous behavior, it only needs to model the system under normal conditions. The
cons are that network data is very difficult to model and is often non stationary. Machine
learning can improve its modeling based on past results. The downside is that training
data is required to train the models. Data mining techniques are good because they do
not need training data and can often find patterns in data with no modeling. Data mining
techniques do in turn produce high false positive rates. Table 2.5 shows each category with
some example techniques listed in [23].
[24] takes a statistical approach to find network anomalies in an Internet Protocol (IP)
network. Using a statistical signal processing approach they compare two consecutive
time-windows to looks for changes in statistical features, specifically variance. The time
series values of both windows are fed into an Auto-Regressive (AR) model which produces
residuals for each window. The two residual windows’ variances are compared to detect
abrupt changes. This method was able to successfully detect file server errors, protocol
errors, network access errors and runaway processes. However, this method is not resilient
against sample loss, which is highly likely due to using SNMP to collect statistics.
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[25] leverages Software Defined Networking (SDN) to try and detect network anomalies and show that past SDN based techniques will be more efficient when used in a small
network environment. 4 different SDN anomaly detection techniques were tested, Threshold Random Walk with Credit Based Rate Limiting (TRW-CB), rate limiting, maximum
entropy detector and NETAD. TRW-CB keeps track of how many new TCP connections
are made which timeout or are reset. The more connections that are not acknowledged the
more likely the host is compromised. Rate limiting has a ”working set” of recent connections for each host. When the machine attempts to make a new connection if it is not in
the working set it is put in a queue. The queue is served at a certain rate and if the queue
becomes larger than a certain threshold then the host is declared as infected. Maximum
entropy detectors work by estimating the distribution of the measured features when in
a normal state. Then as new samples are recorded they are compared to the ”normal”
acting distribution, the similarity is computed using the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence
measure. NETAD is a rule-based method to detect anomalous packets. ”Non-interesting”
traffic is removed and not analyzed. Each packet that is analyzed is given a score which is
based on time and frequency of similar packets received. A packet with a high enough score
is flagged as anomalous. The four techniques were tested on a home network, a home office
network and an ISP network. The results show that these methods are much more effective
in smaller networks with much higher detection rates with much lower false positives.
[26] uses 8 different machine learning algorithms to test for anomalous behavior in multicore routers. The anomalous behavior would be invoked by Trojan viruses that cause core
address spoofing, route looping and traffic diversion. The techniques used are K-Nearest
Neighbors (KNN), Support Vector Machines (SVM), linear regression and decision trees, KMeans, farthest first, estimation maximization and hierarchical clustering. Features that
are monitored: source core, destination core, packet transfer path, distance (number of
hops), power range, execution time range, clock frequency and supply voltage. The accuracy of the supervised learning models performed well, achieving 90% or higher accuracy,
while the unsupervised models did not.
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[27] introduces a network anomaly detection framework, BasisDetect, that introduces
an innovative way to process time series data collected in a network. They form a dictionary that breaks up each link’s signal into a vector of anomalous and non-anomalous
parts by using previous labeled data. The vector is then used with a linear transformation which models how much each part contributes to the signal, giving a power estimate.
The power anomaly estimates are then combined with topology information to find routers
that have many links with high anomaly power. BasisDetect was compared with exponentially weighted moving average and Fourier thresholding techniques in a network backbone
router. BasisDetect was able to identify anomalous behavior with 50% less false positives.
BasisDetect was also able to detect anomalies in a full sized network with 65% less false
positives than a spatial anomaly detection technique.
[28] introduces a failure detection tool for IP networks named Shrink. It forms Shared
Risk Link Groups (SRLGs) which are groups of links that all go down if one of the links
fail. A Bayesian network is generated to check which of the SRLGs is most likely failing.
They retrieve the status of the links which are either alive or dead. Then this information is used to infer which of the SRLGs is the problem. Shrink also takes into account
marginal probabilities i.e some links/SRLGs are more likely to fail and there may be some
misinformation or missing information in the SRLG description. The results are compared
to two other alternatives BayesNet and MinSetCover. Shrink is able to detect the most
likely cause of failure with a higher success rate than the alternatives, with a success rate
of about 90% to 100% depending on the number of errors in the SRLG description.
[29] and [30] use received optical power and bit error rate measurements to uncover
anomalous behavior. The anomalous behavior includes: signal overlap, tight filtering,
gradual drift, cyclic drift and inter-channel interference. [29] used an algorithm based on
Bayesian networks to achieve high prediction rates of 99.2% for a normal state, and 100%
for tight filtering and inter-channel interference. Whereby [30] proposed two algorithms,
the Bit-Error Rate Anomaly Detection (BANDO) and a probabilistic failure identification
algorithm named LUCINDA. BANDO uses nodes within the network to monitor bit-error
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rates and received optical power to determine degrading bit-error ratios. BANDO is able
to send notifications containing useful information to LUCINDA. LUCINDA’s main purpose is to act as a controller for the network and identify network failures using BANDO
notifications. LUCINDA will return to the user the most probable cause of failure from
a set of failure classes. In simulation this model was able to identify signal overlap and
tight filtering with 100% accuracy, gradual drift with up to 70% accuracy and cyclic drift
with up to 52% accuracy. It was also able to predict bit-error rate degradation several days
before it happened.
[31] proposes an efficient algorithm to detect both ”soft” and ”hard” failures in a WDM
optical network, using information that can be retrieved from the WDM layer such as interface error counters to locate failures. This algorithm locates ”hard’ failures using a binary
tree, the leaves of this tree contain how channels relate to nodes in the network. Filling out
this binary tree can be rather expensive so a pre-computation phase was incorporated to
fill out the leaves of the binary tree before an alarm so that when the algorithm receives an
alarm it simply traverses the binary tree to find likely candidates. For ”soft” failures they
are relying on bit error rate, signal to noise ratio and the number of discarded IP packets
thresholds to determine when to send alarms to the algorithm. This is a very general algorithm since it does not specify the exact fault, which could lead to more troubleshooting.
[32] uses a model of many Intrusion Detection Agents (IDAs) which are composed of
event processors, statistical processors, neural network classifiers and a post processor.
These IDAs are chained together to detect intrusions and general anomalous behavior in
a network. The statistical processor compares the PDFs of the recorded network data and
the reference of ”normal” behavior in the network. The PDF similarity is computed using
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test. There are several different classes that are modeled
as normal either over a specified time interval or between events. After being compared
the statistical processor generates a vector to be used as inputs into the neural network for
classification. With each new vector that is generated it updates the reference model to
keep refining it so the neural network can make more accurate predictions in the future.
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Then after the classification is completed the IDA will propagate its result to other IDAs.
The results from simulations show that this method can reliably detect anomalous behavior
when the anomalous behavior only makes up 3-5% of the data captured.
[33] suggested a network design pattern to reliably communicate large amounts of data
reliably. Soft-failures, such as contaminated fiber connectors, can cause poor performance
in the network and can go undetected for several months or longer. TCP will interpret
lost packets due to soft-failures as congestion and reduce throughput to compensate. It is
proposed to use Data Transfer Nodes (DTNs), generally Linux based servers, that are for
the explicit purpose of transferring large amounts of data. There is some tuning required
to make sure that there are no misconfigurations causing poor performance. It is also recommended to combine DTNs with performance monitoring software, such as PerfSONAR,
to isolate problems that may be causing poor performance. Using those two techniques
along with careful placement of network components can increase network efficiency. There
are multiple use cases ranging from data centers to universities that show improvements
following this design pattern.
[34] created a device to inspect optic cable end-faces, particularly in military avionics
settings, using image classification. 2-D images are collected using CMOS sensor arrays,
which are fed into a classification algorithm. The classification algorithm compares the
image with two different standards the iNEMI (used by AT&T) and the Department of
Defense (DoD) standard. Both standards split the end-face into zones that have a range of
imperfections that are acceptable to minimize the risk of failure. This allows for field operators with no expertise to accurately asses the cleanliness of the end-face and replace/clean
them if needed. A depth map is also generated to detect if the imperfections are degradation
or contamination, so the user can take the appropriate action.
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2.8

Data Analysis

With large amounts of data being produced, it is important to be able to analyze this
data and derive meaning from it. There are many ways that this can be accomplished,
by looking at patterns/trends, checking the statistical data such as variance and machine
learning. A first good step is to do Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA). EDA is the process
of understanding the dataset either through visual or statistical exploration. There are
many tools to help accomplish this goal. The correlation matrix can be computed in order
to see the relationship between each pair of features, which in turn can help you do feature
reduction. The distribution of the values can be visualized to see which machine learning
technique is best suited to this dataset or if the dataset needs to be normalized/scaled.

2.8.1

Machine Learning

Machine learning leverages the computational power of modern hardware to classify new
data entries or predict a value of a future entry in a set of data. The benefit of it is
that you do not have to explicitly program how to achieve the desired result, rather you
program how the machine should learn how to predict or classify. Machine learning can be
separated into two classes, supervised and unsupervised learning. The difference between
supervised and unsupervised learning is whether or not you need training data. Training
data is sample data similar to the data the algorithm will be working with except it has
the correct labels attached to them. With this information you can train a classification or
regression model.

2.8.2

Supervised Learning

As mentioned before supervised learning is when the machine learning technique requires
training data to train a model to perform regression or classification. Classification is when
the algorithm is given labels that do not have an inherent ordered value i.e categories and
predicts a new entry based on the training data examples, such as ”apple”, ”orange” and
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”banana” if you wanted to classify fruits. On the other hand, regression has features that do
have an ordered value such as length. A couple of supervised machine learning techniques
are K-nearest neighbors (KNN), decision trees, support vector machines (SVM), logarithmic
regression and the naive Bayes classifier. The two used in this work are KNN and decision
tree classifiers to try and predict the state of the connector which will be labeled either
”contaminated” or ”clean”. The K-Nearest Neighbors algorithm classifies a new data entry
based on the majority classification of the nearest K entries in training data. An example
is shown in Figure 2.18, the K value for this example is set to 3 and there are only 2
features that are considered. The training data has 6 entries which are all either labeled
as ”clean” or ”contaminated”. The new entry’s 2 out of the 3 closest neighbors’ label are
”clean” therefore the new entry will be labeled as ”clean”. KNN classifiers can be used
with more features and use different distance measures i.e non-euclidean to classify new
entries. Decision trees use the training data to create a tree of branching paths which will
be traversed by a new data entry for prediction. A trivial example of a decision tree for
classification is shown in Figure 2.19.
Over-fitting can present a serious problem when training machine learning models.
Over-fitting is when a model is too specifically trained to the training data set so the
model will not generalize well. If a model is over-fitted to the training data it will perform
well when used on the training set however, when new data is presented to the model it
will have poor performance. This is due to the model being to specifically tuned to the
noise/anomalies of the training set not allowing it to generalize well to data it’s never seen
before that may not have similar anomalies or noise.

2.8.3

Unsupervised Learning

Unsupervised learning techniques do not require labeled training data to train a model and
are used to derive an association between two items or find clusters of data. Association
mining is used to find patterns in data sets, the classical example is to find products that are
bought together most frequently. Algorithms that accomplish this are the apriori algorithm
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Figure 2.18: K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN) example
and the frequent pattern growth. Clustering finds inherent groups of data points based on
the similarity of their features. K-means, Density-based spatial clustering of applications
with noise (DBSCAN) and agglomerative hierarchical clustering achieve this. K-means
clustering takes a user-defined number of clusters to form, K. K centroids are placed in
the feature space randomly, each data point is assigned to the cluster corresponding to the
centroid that is the closest. The centroids are then moved to the center of the points that
belong to that cluster. Then the points are reassigned to the cluster centroid that is closest.
This process continues until there are no changes to the cluster assignments of the points.
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Figure 2.19: Decision tree example

2.8.4

Preprocessing

In many cases to get the most out of machine learning algorithms data preprocessing must
be implemented. The most common preprocessing steps that need to be performed are
cleaning and scaling. Cleaning the data requires that unnecessary features and entries with
missing data are removed. An alternative to removing the entries with missing data is to
fill the missing data in with a value. For instance, if one of the samples is missing one
feature’s data, you could remove it from the data set or replace the null value with the
mean of the same feature of other samples. This means that you can keep the data and
not skew the results by having empty entries. Scaling is also important because many
machine learning techniques, such as k-nearest neighbors classifiers, take the magnitude of
the input data into account. Thus if the scale of one of the features is much larger than
the other it will have a much more significant impact on the result than the other features.
Also similar to scaling normalizing changes the distribution to be normal, i.e 0 mean and
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Table 2.6: One hot encoding
Entry

Fruit

Apple

Orange

Banana

0

Apple

1

0

0

1

Orange

0

1

0

2

Banana

0

0

1

variance of 1, which is also done to increase the effectiveness of certain machine learning
techniques. Data engineering is also a helpful tool to optimize the performance of models.
Data engineering is when you use existing features to create a new more useful feature that
the model can use. Example, if the dataset contains the start time, stop time and bits sent
you could calculate throughput by:

T hroughput =

Bits sent
(Start time − Stop time)

(2.8)

And dependent on the application having the throughput could be a much more useful
feature than the other three separately. Depending on the type of application, it may be
necessary to encode categorical values. A common scenario when you would need to do
this is when using neural networks. Since neural networks cannot take categorical data as
inputs you must encode it into a number value. A common encoding scheme is one-hot
encoding which is done by taking the categorical sample space and create a new feature
for each unique value or omitting one entry. Going back to the fruit labels, if we have
”apple”, ”orange” and ”banana” as the sample space for labels you could one hot encode
every entry as shown in Table 2.6. You can also omit one entry and if all other values are
0 then it is the non-included label as shown in Figure 2.7.

2.8.5

Hyper-parameter tuning

Hyper-parameters are values that affect how the machine learns and are not directly related to the input data. Some examples are the number of nodes in a layer of a deep neural
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Table 2.7: One hot encoding without last column
Fruit

Apple

Orange

0

Apple

1

0

1

Orange

0

1

2

Banana

0

0

network or the K value for the KNN classifier. Hyper-parameter tuning is the process of
finding the combination of values for each hyper-parameter which yields the best performance. Two common techniques to tune hyper-parameters are grid searches and random
searches. A grid search will compare the performance of the model trying different specified
hyper-parameter values. Random search picks a random point in the set of possible points
to be the best value, then randomly chooses a new value near the best value to compare
performance with. If the new value does better it becomes the best value. This pattern
continues until a stop condition is met.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
The focus of this work is to detect contaminated optical connectors through analysis network statistics that can be collected with no added hardware. As shown in the related work,
optical power is reduced by contamination on the connectors. This presents an opportunity to leverage the optical power measurements provided by SFPs to detect contamination
remotely with no additional hardware. As a preface for detecting contaminated fibers using SFPs it is important to consider the accuracy of the SFP’s DOM capabilities. The
SFF-8472 outlines the acceptable accuracy for each statistic provided by DOM. Figure 3.1
shows the standard tolerance range of the SFP optical power measurements and Figure 3.2
shows the possible loss induced by the inaccuracy of the SFP optical power measurements.
This tolerance range is much too wide to be useful in practice. In actuality this tolerance
range is device specific and is very likely to be much smaller than the proposed ± 3dB,
however on the data sheet they will not advertise this and simply put that it adheres to
the SFF-8472 standard.
The main objectives of this work are to:
• Measure the accuracy of SFP optical power data.
• Find a framework to detect contaminated connectors, using SFP optical power data.
• Detect contamination using Layer 2, 3 and 4 network statistics.
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Figure 3.1: SFP tolerance range standard. The shaded area represents the acceptable range of accuracy.

3.1

Accuracy of SFP Optical Power Data

In order to find the true accuracy range of the SFPs, a series of experiments were conducted
where the values of a dedicated power meter were compared to that reported by the SFP
DOM through the switches. The experimental setup is shown in Figure 3.3 and shows the
tolerance of the equipment used.

3.1.1

Test Cases

The following measurements were made to test the accuracy of two SFPs. Each of the
following values was compared to the value read by the power meter:
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Figure 3.2: Loss induced by tolerance range standard. The shaded area represents
the possible loss range.

3.1.2

Tolerance adjustment

It is important to account for all possible power losses in this setup to find the true accuracy
of the SFP. This means that we have to take into account every factor that could possibly
affect the optical power. Thus the loses when using the experimental setup in Figure 3.3
that need to be accounted for are:
• TC = 1 - Power loss due to the cable during Tx readings (≤ 0.3 dB = 7%)
• TA = 1 - Power loss due to the adapter for the power meter (≤ 0.3 dB = 7%)
• TM = 1 ± Power meter inaccuracy (± 0.211 dB = 5%)
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Figure 3.3: Power meter connected to SFP via fiber cable to measure accuracy.
All tolerances listed are from the manufacturer’s specifications. If the
P ower M eter M easurement = PM and SF P M easurement = PS then the max difference
for Tx readings can be described as:

max(δT x ) = max(PS − PM TC TA TM + , PS − PM TC TA TM − )

(3.1)

and the max difference for Rx readings can be described as:

max(δRx ) = max(PS − PM TA TM + , PS − PM TA TM − )

(3.2)

However if you know the measured insertion loss of the cable or the adapter it is better
to use that number.
The power loss due to the cable was not considered during the Rx readings do to both
measurements being taken at the end of the cable. Whereas for the Tx readings the power
meter reading was at the end of the cable and the SFP reading did not have the insertion
loss due to the cable so we must adjust the values for this.
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Table 3.1: SFP Accuracy Test Cases
Tx power of clean SMF connectors using a Fiberstore SFP
Rx power of clean SMF connectors using a Fiberstore SFP
Rx power of contaminated SMF connectors using a Fiberstore SFP
Tx power of clean SMF connectors using a Finisar SFP
Rx power of clean SMF connectors using a Finisar SFP
Rx power of contaminated SMF connectors using a Finisar SFP
Tx power of clean MMF connectors using a Fiberstore SFP
Rx power of clean MMF connectors using a Fiberstore SFP
Rx power of contaminated MMF connectors using a Fiberstore SFP
Tx power of clean MMF connectors using a Finisar SFP
Rx power of clean MMF connectors using a Finisar SFP
Rx power of contaminated MMF connectors using a Finisar SFP

3.2

Detecting Contaminated Connectors

To study the effects of contaminated fiber optic connectors a series of experiments were
conducted using the topology shown in Figure 3.4. There are two hosts both running iPerf3
on Ubuntu 18.04 transferring data across one fiber optic link while a remote host monitors
and records the Tx and Rx values provided by the two switches/SFPs.

3.2.1

Contamination and Cleaning Processes

To contaminate the end faces of the optical connectors in the case of oil, the connectors
were gently touched with a fingertip multiple times to ensure that there was an oil residue
as shown in Figure 3.5 (a). To contaminated the connectors in the case of dust, fine grain
sand was applied to both sides of the fiber optic cable using a swab that resulted in particles
blocking the core as shown in Figure 3.5 (b).
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Figure 3.4: Topology of experimental network

a) Fingerprint contamination process

b) Dust contamination process

Figure 3.5: Contamination process
To clean the cable a one-push pen was used as shown in Figure 3.6 (a). To clean the
SFP connectors the same one-push pen was used as shown in Figure 3.6 (b).

3.2.2

Monitoring

The monitoring was conducted using FiberPI a software developed specifically for this
work. It is implemented using Python which will poll switches for DOM statistics, which
include Tx and Rx power levels when directed to.
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a) Cable cleaning process

b) SFP cleaning process

Figure 3.6: Cleaning process

3.2.3

Test Cases

For each test case the Tx and Rx values of both SFPs will be collected every 30 seconds
over a 24 hour period, this will provide 2880 data points for each set. For each tuple of
Tx and Rx value pairs the difference can be calculated to give the power lost between
transmission in both directions. Samples of the power difference provided through FiberPI
were analyzed for 6 separate test cases:
• Clean SMF Link
• SMF Link with Fingerprints
• SMF Link Contaminated with Dust
• Clean MMF Link
• MMF Link with Fingerprints
• MMF Link Contaminated with Dust

3.3

Top-Down Method

It is preferable to monitor the network for symptoms higher up the OSI data stack because
it is too taxing to be consistently polling every single SFP in the network to make sure
that they are clean. Thus we turn to layer 2, 3 and 4 statistics. Layer 2 will be monitored
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using ifconfig, layer 3 will be monitored by nstat and layer 4 will be monitored using iPerf
and nstat. A list of the statistics that were considered are listed in Appendix A. The
motivation for using a layered approach is to leverage machine learning techniques in order
to detect poor network performance that could be a symptom of contaminated links in
the network. Once poor performance is detected using machine learning then Inequality
4.14 can be used to confirm our suspicions. This should alleviate the problem of polling
overhead and allow this detection system to scale better.
Similar to the other experiments the topology in Figure 3.4 will be used. The two test
cases will be when the fiber link is contaminated with dust and when the link is clean. The
Layer 2, 3 and 4 statistics listed in Appendix A will be collected. Filtering will be done to
the samples due to the feature space being much too large. Principle Component Analysis
(PCA) and choosing the features with the highest normalized variances can be used to
find the features that are affected the most by the contaminated link. Then a handful
of machine learning techniques will be trained using the Python library Scikit-Learn to
attempt to classify new observations.
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Chapter 4
Results and Discussion
4.1

SFP Accuracy

The results of comparing the values given by the power meter to the values given by the
SFPs DOM capability are summarized in Table 4.1. The optical power meter measurement
range is in this format, measured power; (minimum power, maximum power). The range in
parentheses accounts for the power meter accuracy tolerance of ± 0.211 dB. Similarly, the
adjusted value range shows the power meter measurement adjusted in this format, adjusted
power; (minimum power, maximum power). Where the range in parentheses accounts for
the adapter and cable loss for Tx measurements only. Then the max difference can be
computed by using the largest difference between the SFP measurement and one of the
adjusted value ranges which is in bold.
Table 4.1: SFP Transceiver Accuracy
Optical Transceiver

Optical Power Meter

Adjusted Value Range

Max Difference

Max Difference

Measurement (mW)

Measurement Range (mW)

(mW)

(mW)

(dB)

{Tx, SMF, Fiberstore, Clean}

0.247

0.226; (0.215, 0.237)

0.252; (0.239, 0.264)

0.017

0.277

{Rx, SMF, Fiberstore, Clean}

0.222

0.24; (0.228, 0.252)

0.257; (0.244, 0.270)

0.048

0.711

{Rx, SMF, Fiberstore, Contaminated}

0.148

0.16; (0.152, 0.168)

0.171; (0.163, 0.180)

0.032

0.711

Test

{Tx, SMF, Finisar, Clean}

0.284

0.314; (0.298, 0.330)

0.350; (0.332, 0.367)

0.083

0.888

{Rx, SMF, Finisar, Clean}

0.224

0.242; (0.230, 0.254)

0.259; (0.246, 0.272)

0.048

0.709

{Rx, SMF, Finisar, Contaminated}

0.148

0.160; (0.152, 0.168)

0.171; (0.163, 0.180)

0.032

0.711

{Tx, MMF, Fiberstore, Clean}

0.273

0.243; (0.231 ,0.255)

0.271; (0.257, 0.284)

0.016

0.258

{Rx, MMF, Fiberstore, Clean}

0.247

0.255; (0.242, 0.268)

0.273; (0.260, 0.287)

0.040

0.565

{Rx, MMF, Fiberstore, Contaminated}

0.160

0.167; (0.159, 0.175)

0.179; (0.170, 0.188)

0.028

0.601

{Tx, MMF, Finisar, Clean}

0.208

0.227; (0.216, 0.238)

0.253; (0.240, 0.266)

0.058

0.852

{Rx, MMF, Finisar, Clean}

0.210

0.239; (0.227, 0.251)

0.256; (0.243, 0.269)

0.059

0.860

{Rx, MMF, Finisar, Contaminated}

0.156

0.168; (0.160, 0.176)

0.180; (0.171, 0.189)

0.033

0.699
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The results are clear, the ± 3 dB standard is not realistic at all. For all cases, where we
took the worst case scenario, all had a max difference of < 1 dB. Considering this was the
case for both brands of SFP using 4 different inexpensive SFPs on both types of fiber, it
seems that they are much more accurate than the standard would have you believe. This
is important as the following framework will take into account these possible inaccuracies.

4.2

Contamination Detection

Now that the inaccuracies of the SFP DOM optical power measurements have been explored, we can use this information to create a framework that can identify contamination
that affects optical power, i.e contamination that is causing insertion loss. This will be
achieved by finding the threshold where it is certain that there is contamination causing
insertion loss by taking into account all other factors.

4.2.1

Contamination Detection Method

It is important to note that contamination is not the only factor that will induce insertion
loss, so that must be taken into account as well in the framework. To find this threshold
we must get the expected power loss due to non-contaminant factors (α) and bias it by
the maximum possible power loss due to the SFP transceiver inaccuracies. The maximum
power loss due to inaccuracies occurs when the actual or ”true” power difference (δ) is
greater than the measured power difference (δ̂). There are 3 inputs that will be needed to
find an accurate threshold which are:
• λT x = | Tolerance range of Tx SFP Transceiver (dB) |
• λRx = | Tolerance range of Rx SFP Transceiver (dB) |
• ∆ = Expected attenuation due to non-contaminant factors (dB)
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∆ is calculated by adding all the loss you expect to see in the tested link due to
non-contaminant factors such as attenuation due to distance, optical splitters, connection
adapters, etc. Using ∆ you can compute α with this equation:
−∆



α = t̂ 1 − 10 10



(4.1)

Where t̂ is the measured Tx power.
Example: Assume you have a 50/50 optical (3 dB loss) splitter in the middle of a 10
km single mode optical fiber which has attenuation per km of 0.5 dB/km and an insertion
loss of 0.3 dB. Add up all the loses in dB to get delta:
∆ = 0.3 + 0.5 · 10 + 3 = 8.5 dB

(4.2)

Then use this ∆ to compute α,


α = t̂ 1 − 10

−8.5
10



= 0.1479t̂

(4.3)

The rule to detect contamination can be given by:

δ̂ > α + max(δ − δ̂)

(4.4)

As a note, we do not need to consider (|δ − δ̂|) due to the fact that (δ − δ̂) ≥ (δ̂ − δ).
To show this, because δ̂ is a constant:

max(δ − δ̂) = max(δ) − min(δ̂) = max(δ) − δ̂

(4.5)

max(δ̂ − δ) = max(δ̂) − min(δ) = δ̂ − min(δ)

(4.6)

and

The true power loss can never be less than 0, since there are no amplifiers, thus min(δ)
is capped at 0 then and lowest value for max(δ) is 0 thus,
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max(δ) ≥ −(min(δ))

(4.7)

max(δ − δ̂) ≥ max(δ̂ − δ)

(4.8)

which means,

moving forward with the right hand side of inequality 4.4 we can expand it to:

α + max(δ − δ̂) = α + max((t − r) − (t̂ − r̂))

(4.9)

where t = true power transmitted, r = true power received, t̂ = measured power transmitted and r̂ = measured power received. Because t̂ and r̂ are constants equation 4.9
becomes:

α + max(t − r) − (t̂ − r̂) = α + max(t) − min(r) − t̂ + r̂

(4.10)

Where max(t) is the largest value for Tx power that the SFP optical power data will
show and min(r) is the smallest value for Rx power that the SFP optical power data will
show:


max(t) = t̂ 10


min(r) = r̂ 10

λT x
10



−λRx
10

(4.11)


(4.12)

Substituting equations 4.1, 4.11 and 4.12 and into 4.10:


−∆

t̂ 1 − 10 10





+ t̂ 10

λT x
10





− r̂ 10

−λRx
10



− t̂ + r̂

(4.13)

Finally, using 4.13 as the right hand side of inequality 4.4 and simplifying, a connector
is contaminated if:


δ̂ > t̂ 10

λT x
10

− 10

−∆
10
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+ r̂ 1 − 10

−λRx
10



(4.14)

a) SMF Tx Power

b) SMF Rx Power

Figure 4.1: SMF Power Measurements with ± 1 dB error bars

4.2.2

Contamination Detection Results

After a day of running, 2880 samples for each test case were collected and analyzed. Figure
4.1 shows the Tx power and Rx power for both switches using single-mode connectors.
Each bar shows the mean of the power measurements with the error bar showing the more
realistic ± 1 dB. Thus the true power must be within the range of the error bar. The
confidence intervals were computed but were too small to include in the figure. It acts as
expected even over a long period of time, 24 hours. The Tx values all stay roughly the
same, independent of the state of contamination. The error bars are also near identical due
to the power levels being similar. When the connectors only have fingerprints, the results
are inconclusive, there is no significant optical power change caused by fingerprints, a trend
that will continue. However, the Rx power on both switches have a significant decrease in
optical power due to the dust. The dust also has a smaller error bar due to having a small
value being read from the optical transceiver.
Figure 4.2 shows the power measurements collected using multi-mode connectors. These
measurements follow the pattern presented by the single-mode measurements. The Tx
power stays the same independent of the contamination status, while the Rx values only
see a significant change when contaminated with dust.
Now we can use those 2880 samples to compute the insertion loss i.e power loss. Using
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a) MMF Tx Power

b) MMF Rx Power

Figure 4.2: MMF Power Measurements with ± 1 dB error bars
these values we can evaluate the measurements using Inequality 4.14, where ∆ = 0.3dB
and λT x = λRx = 1dB. Figure 4.3 shows the mean power loss from switch A to switch B
(Switch A Tx - Switch B Rx) and from switch B to switch A (Switch B Tx - Switch A
Rx). There are error bars in the figure, however there is almost no variation in the power
lost over time causing them to be minuscule. There are red dashed lines for each case,
where the inequality finds the connectors to be contaminated. The clean and fingerprint
contaminated connectors do not cross this threshold meaning that we can not declare
them contaminated because the power loss may be caused due to inaccuracies. The dust
contaminated connector does cross this threshold by a wide margin, meaning that one of
the two relevant connectors is contaminated. The power loss caused by the dust was 3 dB
from A to B and almost all of the power from B to A, much higher than the anticipated
0.3 dB.
Figure 4.4 shows the mean power difference from switch A to switch B using single-mode
connectors. Again, they have error bars which are the black dots in the figure, showing
little to no variation throughout the testing period. A similar story as the past, the clean
and fingerprint contaminated connectors did not cross the threshold, meaning that they
are likely uncontaminated. The dust contaminated connectors pass the threshold by a wide
margin again meaning that they are contaminated.
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Figure 4.3: Power loss using single-mode fiber, where the dashed lines represent
the contamination threshold for each case

There is something interesting when looking at the clean and fingerprint contaminated
samples in Figure 4.4, the power loss was actually negative i.e a power gain. Using Figure
3.4 as the topology for this experiment it seems counter-intuitive that there is power gain,
as there are no components in this network that amplify optical signals. The explanation
for this is simply that the inaccuracies of the SFP are at play, it is possible that measured
Tx power is at the lower bound of the ± 1 dB range and the measured Rx power is at the
upper bound of the ± 1 dB range. Considering PT x ≈ PRx = P and λT x = λRx = 1:


P · 10−

λT x
10





− P · 10

λRx
10



= P (0.794 − 1.258) = −0.464 · P

(4.15)

Thus, Equation 4.15 gives a negative value, showing that it is possible to get negative
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Figure 4.4: Power loss using single-mode fiber, where the dashed lines represent
the contamination threshold for each case

values. In the end it works out, the mean of the clean and fingerprint contaminated samples
do not cross the threshold meaning that they are not contaminated, which is why we can
assume PT x ≈ PRx . And finally, the dust contaminated connectors, cross the threshold
detecting the final case as contaminated using the contamination rule.
As demonstrated by the examples Inequality 4.14 was able to detect all the contaminated
connectors with no false positives, showing that it is an effective method to use DOM
statistics provided by SFPs to detect contaminated connectors.

56

4.2.3

Contamination Score

To provide a more detailed description of the severity of contamination, rather than just if
it is contaminated or not, it is proposed to use a score that increases as the contamination
makes more of a difference on optical performance. We will normalize the value of the
contamination score (CS) by setting 100% power loss as a contamination score of 100 by
using a contamination coefficient (CC). CC and CS are given by:
CC =

100
105(t̂−α)

(4.16)

−1

CS = max(0, CC · (105(δ̂−α) − 1))

(4.17)

If T is the threshold for contamination given by:


T = t̂ 10

λT x
10

− 10

−∆
10





+ r̂ 1 − 10

−λRx
10



(4.18)

Figure 4.5 shows how the number line is separated, the CS will provide a more intuitive
description of power loss > α.

Figure 4.5: Power loss threshold visualization
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A translation can be made from T to a CS score (τcs ) which is given by:
τcs = CC · (105(T −α) − 1)

(4.19)

If a CS ≥ τcs , then the connector is contaminated, given ∆, λRx , and λT x are accurate.

4.3

Top-Down Method

4000 samples were collected and analyzed with all the statistics shown in Appendix A. Then
the features that did not change were removed, which was almost all of them. The only
two significant features that changed were the retransmissions reported by nstat and the
delayed acknowledgments reported by nstat. Using these features a decision tree classifier
and a k-nearest neighbors classifier were trained.

4.3.1

Initial Analysis

Figure 4.6 shows a scatter plot of the data points collected with the contamination labels
that are assigned to it based on the contamination score, where blue is clean and red is
contaminated. Just through visual analysis, there seems to be a concentration of contaminated samples where the delayed acknowledgments and retransmission counts are higher.
The correlation between retransmissions and contaminated links is intuitive due to the fact
that some of the packets will be discarded due to errors in the TCP segments, meaning
they will have to be retransmitted.
Figure 4.7 (a) shows the scatter plot of all the test samples with the color mapping
corresponding to the predicted labels made by the decision tree classifier. The decision tree
classifier follows that pattern that we saw previously of high retransmission and delayed
acknowledgment counts correlates to a contaminated link. Using a 10 fold cross-validation
gives a mean accuracy of 0.76, but the important thing to note is that it has a precision
of 1 for the contaminated class. This is important if we use the layered approach because
all the contaminated samples were labeled as contaminated which would then be verified
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Figure 4.6: Scatter plot of data with true labels

a) Classification using a decision tree classifier

b) Classification using a k-nearest neighbors classifier

Figure 4.7: Classification using machine learning techniques
by looking at the power difference of the relevant links, even if not all of the clean samples
were labeled clean.
Figure 4.7 (b) shows the scatter plot of all the test samples with the color mapping
corresponding to the predicted labels made by the k-nearest neighbors classifier. The KNN
classifier is eerily similar to the results of the decision tree classifier. It is classifying the
results in the same way where higher retransmission and delayed acknowledgment counts
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result in a predicted label of contaminated. It also has the desirable feature of having a
precision of 1 for the contaminated labels. This classifier had an accuracy mean of 0.75
using a 10 fold cross-validation.
Both of these techniques can detect contaminated links decently using just the two
most varying features, in fact adding the other features decreases the accuracy due to
them having little to no variance. There is a reason that these are quite similar though,
each sample is only recording the retransmissions throughout one minute. Many of the
samples reported the number of delayed acknowledgments and retransmissions as 1 due
to the sample period being so short meaning less time for retransmissions to happen. To
explore this data set even further to see how these two features change over longer samples,
the sum of both features over every 50 samples was computed then ran through the same
data analysis as above.
Figure 4.8 is the scatter plot of the true labels after aggregating 50 samples into 1, going
from 2000 samples down to just 40. This provides a much more clear picture of how the
contamination is affecting the network performance over time which isn’t so obvious when
looking at the 1 minute samples.

Figure 4.8: True labels after aggregation plotted
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a) Classification using a decision tree classifier after aggregation

b) Classification using a k-nearest neighbors classifier after aggregation

Figure 4.9: Classification using machine learning techniques
Figure 4.9 (a) shows the results of the decision tree classifier on a scatter plot after
aggregation. The aggregation boosted the performance of the classifier. It follows the same
pattern that has been consistent throughout these experiments however now that is much
clearer after the aggregation the decision tree classifier has an accuracy of 1.
Figure 4.9 (b) shows the results of the k-nearest neighbor classifier on a scatter plot after
aggregation. This classifier also achieved an accuracy of 1 and is identical in performance
to the decision tree classifier.

4.3.2

Second Analysis

However, one sample set was not enough to verify that it was the contamination that was
causing these errors. The same methodology was used to run several more experiments.
Some of the new experiments had the topology connected to the internet to see if this
technique is even feasible on a simple network with the random factors that the web traffic
provides. The results were inconsistent, the following experiments after the initial one did
not show any significant change going from a clean to a contaminated connector. The
data points were still run through the decision tree classifier and the KNN classifier with
lackluster results. The accuracy for the decision tree was 0.52 and the accuracy for the
KNN classifier was 0.51, at best.
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4.3.3

Top-Down Approach Experiment Conclusions

Figure 4.10: Static power loss causing loss of signal
The layered approach to detecting contaminated fibers was inconclusive, due to the
inconsistencies of the higher layer protocol statistics. Although the initial results seemed
promising it was not enough to be sure that it was the contaminated connectors causing the
errors. Thus, analysis to explain this behavior was done. The connectors were contaminated
to the point just before there was loss of signal, well below the receiver sensitivity (-17
dBm) at about -23 dBm and ping was used to monitor for corrupted bits. Even when the
signal attenuation was almost at 100% there were still no corrupted bits that were seen.
This presents a binary situation for these experiments, either the network performs well
even with contamination or there is loss of signal due to contamination. Some insight is
provided from the power experiments, in Figures 4.4 and 4.3 there was almost no variation
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in the power lost over 24 hours meaning that the loss is static. As long as the power level
for signaling a 1 is higher than the quantizer threshold then the network should function
correctly, on the other hand, if the power level is lower than the threshold then, due to the
static nature of the attenuation caused by contamination, all the 1s will end up being 0s
causing loss of signal. This idea is illustrated in Figure 4.10.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This work looked at the effects of contamination on optical fiber connectors and developed
inequality 4.14 to detect contaminated optical connectors. The inequality detects contaminated fiber connectors through the use of Small Form-Factor Pluggable (SFP) Digital
Optical Monitoring (DOM) power readings. Because the inequality leverages SFP power
measurements to detect contamination with certainty, the tolerance range of the SFP power
measurements had to be considered. [10] suggests a wide tolerance range of ± 3 dB which
is much too wide to detect contamination that only affects the optical power slightly. To
verify that the tolerance range is much smaller than that in practice the power readings
from the SFPs and the power readings of a dedicated power meter were compared. All
power losses due to cabling and connectors were considered when comparing these values
and the results are shown in Table 4.1. Even taking the worst-case scenario for each of the
comparisons the tolerance range of the SFP power measurements is no more than ± 1 dB,
concluding that it is suitable to use these measurements for detection. Inequality 4.14 was
successfully able to detect contaminated optical connectors during the experiments with
no false positives. It is acknowledged that this inequality only holds true if the contamination affects optical power, however, if there is contamination present and the optical power
is not changed then it should not cause instability or failure of the system. Some contamination could possibly cause thermal issues but no performance degradation but that is
beyond the scope of this work. This work also discussed trying to detect contaminated fiber
connectors by looking at statistics other than optical power. This included analyzing the
exhaustive list of statistics shown in Appendix A using two machine learning techniques for
classification. Although initially, the results seemed promising using a decision tree model
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and K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN) model, ultimately it proved to be inconclusive and have
poor performance after many trials. However, it did lead to the conclusion that without
perturbation of the contaminant used, a static loss of optical power is seen and will result
in either no bit errors or complete loss of signal.
In the future this work could be expanded by verifying that Inequality 4.14 will scale to
much larger networks where it would prove to be more useful and finding more sophisticated
methods to detect contaminated fiber connectors at higher levels of the OSI model using
the list of statistics in Appendix A.
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Appendix A
Network Data
The following appendix is a compiled list of network data statistics that can be obtained
to analyze the performance of the network.

A.1

Layer 1 Statistics Tables
Table A.1: Layer 1 Statistics Description
Data Element Vantage Point Collection Method
Supply Voltage

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

Teperature

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

Rx Power

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

Tx Power

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

Laser Bias

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

Tx Fault

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

Loss of Signal

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

Link Length

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

Table A.2: Layer 1 Statistics Description
Data Element Stat Description
Supply Voltage Voltage driving SFP
Continued on next page
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Table A.2 – Continued from previous page
Data Element Stat Description
Teperature

Temperature of SFP

Rx Power

Rx Optical Power

Tx Power

Tx Optical Power

Laser Bias

Bias current of the laser

Tx Fault
Loss of Signal
Link Length

A.2

Faults with transmitting data
Low or no power causing a loss of signal
Test the length of a link

Layer 2 Statistics Tables
Table A.3: Layer 2 Statistics Description
Data Element

Vantage Point Collection Method

Total Packets Received (Octets)

Switch

SSH

Packets Received 64 Octets

Switch

SSH

Packets Received 65–127 Octets

Switch

SSH

Packets Received 128–255 Octets

Switch

SSH

Packets Received 256–511 Octets

Switch

SSH

Packets Received 512–1023 Octets

Switch

SSH

Packets Received 1024–1518 Octets

Switch

SSH

Packets Received >1518 Octets

Switch

SSH

Packets RX and TX 64 Octets

Switch

SSH

Packets RX and TX 65–127 Octets

Switch

SSH

Packets RX and TX 128–255 Octets

Switch

SSH

Packets RX and TX 256–511 Octets

Switch

SSH

Continued on next page
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Table A.3 – Continued from previous page
Data Element

Vantage Point Collection Method

Packets RX and TX 512–1023 Octets

Switch

SSH

Packets RX and TX 1024–1518 Octets

Switch

SSH

Packets RX and TX 1519–2047 Octets

Switch

SSH

Packets RX and TX 2048–4095 Octets

Switch

SSH

Packets RX and TX 4096–9216 Octets

Switch

SSH

Total Packets Received Without Error

Switch

SSH

Unicast Packets Received

Switch

SSH

Multicast Packets Received

Switch

SSH

Broadcast Packets Received

Switch

SSH

Total Packets Received with MAC Errors

Switch

SSH

Jabbers Received

Switch

SSH

Fragments/Undersize Received

Switch

SSH

Alignment Errors

Switch

SSH

FCS Errors

Switch

SSH

Overruns

Switch

SSH

Total Received Packets Not Forwarded

Switch

SSH

802.3x Pause Frames Received

Switch

SSH

Unacceptable Frame Type

Switch

SSH

Total Packets Transmitted (Octets)

Switch

SSH

Packets Transmitted 64 Octets

Switch

SSH

Packets Transmitted 65–127 Octets

Switch

SSH

Packets Transmitted 128–255 Octets

Switch

SSH

Packets Transmitted 256–511 Octets

Switch

SSH

Packets Transmitted 512–1023 Octets

Switch

SSH

Packets Transmitted 1024–1518 Octets

Switch

SSH

Continued on next page
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Table A.3 – Continued from previous page
Data Element

Vantage Point Collection Method

Packets Transmitted >1518 Octets

Switch

SSH

Max Frame Size

Switch

SSH

Total Packets Transmitted Successfully

Switch

SSH

Unicast Packets Transmitted

Switch

SSH

Multicast Packets Transmitted

Switch

SSH

Broadcast Packets Transmitted

Switch

SSH

Total Transmit Errors

Switch

SSH

Total Transmit Packets Discards

Switch

SSH

Single Collision Frames

Switch

SSH

Multiple Collision Frames

Switch

SSH

Excessive Collisions

Switch

SSH

802.3x Pause Frames Transmitted

Switch

SSH

GVRP PDUs Received

Switch

SSH

GVRP PDUs Transmitted

Switch

SSH

GVRP Failed Registrations

Switch

SSH

GMRP PDUs Received

Switch

SSH

GMRP PDUs Transmitted

Switch

SSH

GMRP Failed Registrations

Switch

SSH

STP BPDUs Transmitted

Switch

SSH

STP BPDUs Received

Switch

SSH

RST BPDUs Transmitted

Switch

SSH

RSTP BPDUs Received

Switch

SSH

MSTP BPDUs Transmitted

Switch

SSH

MSTP BPDUs Received

Switch

SSH

EAPOL Frames Transmitted

Switch

SSH

Continued on next page
74

Table A.3 – Continued from previous page
Data Element

Vantage Point Collection Method

EAPOL Frames Received

Switch

SSH

Time Since Counters Last Cleared

Switch

SSH

Rx packets

Linux Host

ifconig

Rx errors

Linux Host

ifconig

Rx drops

Linux Host

ifconig

Rx overruns

Linux Host

ifconig

Rx frame

Linux Host

ifconig

Tx packets

Linux Host

ifconig

Tx errors

Linux Host

ifconig

Tx drops

Linux Host

ifconig

Tx overruns

Linux Host

ifconig

Tx carrier

Linux Host

ifconig

Table A.4: Layer 2 Statistics Description
Data Element
Total Packets Received (Octets)
Packets Received 64 Octets

Stat Description
Total Bytes Received by Switch
Packets Received with size of exactly 64
bytes

Packets Received 65–127 Octets

Packets Received with size between 65–127
bytes

Packets Received 128–255 Octets

Packets Received with size between 128–255
bytes

Packets Received 256–511 Octets

Packets Received with size between 256–511
bytes
Continued on next page
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Table A.4 – Continued from previous page
Data Element
Packets Received 512–1023 Octets

Stat Description
Packets Received with size between 512–1023
bytes

Packets Received 1024–1518 Octets

Packets Received with size between 1024–
1518 bytes

Packets Received >1518 Octets

Packets Received with size greater than 1518
bytes

Packets RX and TX 64 Octets

Packets Sent or Received with size of exactly
64 bytes

Packets RX and TX 65–127 Octets

Packets Sent or Received with size between
65–127 bytes

Packets RX and TX 128–255 Octets

Packets Sent or Received with size between
128–255 bytes

Packets RX and TX 256–511 Octets

Packets Sent or Received with size between
256–511 bytes

Packets RX and TX 512–1023 Octets

Packets Sent or Received with size between
512–1023 bytes

Packets RX and TX 1024–1518 Octets

Packets Sent or Received with size between
1024–1518 bytes

Packets RX and TX 1519–2047 Octets

Packets Sent or Received with size between
1519–2047 bytes

Packets RX and TX 2048–4095 Octets

Packets Sent or Received with size between
2048–4095 bytes

Packets RX and TX 4096–9216 Octets

Packets Sent or Received with size between
4096–9216 bytes
Continued on next page
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Table A.4 – Continued from previous page
Data Element
Total Packets Received Without Error

Stat Description
Total Packets Received with no error but
could have still been dropped due to other
issues such as a full buffer

Unicast Packets Received

Packets Received with only one destination

Multicast Packets Received

Packets Received with more than one destination

Broadcast Packets Received

Broadcast Packets Received

Total Packets Received with MAC Errors Packets Received with Ethernet Errors
Jabbers Received

The total number of packets received that
were longer than 1518 octets (excluding
framing bits, but including FCS octets), and
had either a bad Frame Check Sequence
(FCS) with an integral number of octets
(FCS Error) or a bad FCS with a non–
integral number of octets (Alignment Error).

Fragments/Undersize Received

Packets received with length smaller than 64
bytes.

Alignment Errors

Frames that either have a bad FCS or have
an uneven number of bits

FCS Errors
Overruns

Bad Frame Check Sequence (FCS)
When the buffer gets full and has to drop
packets

Total Received Packets Not Forwarded

A count of valid frames received which were
discarded (in other words, filtered) by the
forwarding process
Continued on next page
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Table A.4 – Continued from previous page
Data Element
802.3x Pause Frames Received

Stat Description
A count of MAC Control frames received on
this interface with an opcode indicating the
PAUSE operation. This counter does not increment when the interface is operating in
half–duplex mode.

Unacceptable Frame Type
Total Packets Transmitted (Octets)
Packets Transmitted 64 Octets

Bad Frame type, not ethernet.
Total bytes transmitted
Packets Sent with size of exactly 64 bytes

Packets Transmitted 65–127 Octets

Packets sent with size between 65–127 bytes

Packets Transmitted 128–255 Octets

Packets sent with size between 128–255 bytes

Packets Transmitted 256–511 Octets

Packets sent with size between 256–511 bytes

Packets Transmitted 512–1023 Octets

Packets sent with size between 512–1023
bytes

Packets Transmitted 1024–1518 Octets

Packets sent with size between 1024–1518
bytes

Packets Transmitted >1518 Octets

Packets sent with size greater than 1518
bytes

Max Frame Size

Maximum ethernet frame size, not including
MAC information.

Total Packets Transmitted Successfully

The number of frames that have been transmitted by this port to its segment.

Unicast Packets Transmitted

The total number of packets that higher–
level protocols requested be transmitted to a
subnetwork–unicast address, including those
that were discarded or not sent.
Continued on next page
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Table A.4 – Continued from previous page
Data Element
Multicast Packets Transmitted

Stat Description
The total number of packets that higher–
level protocols requested be transmitted to a
Multicast address, including those that were
discarded or not sent.

Broadcast Packets Transmitted

The total number of packets that higher–
level protocols requested be transmitted to
the Broadcast address, including those that
were discarded or not sent.

Total Transmit Errors

The sum of Single, Multiple, and Excessive
Collisions.

Total Transmit Packets Discards

The sum of single collision frames discarded,
multiple collision frames discarded, and excessive frames discarded.

Single Collision Frames

A count of the number of successfully transmitted frames on a particular interface for
which transmission is inhibited by exactly
one collision.

Multiple Collision Frames

A count of the number of successfully transmitted frames on a particular interface for
which transmission is inhibited by more than
one collision.

Excessive Collisions

A count of frames for which transmission on
a particular interface fails due to excessive
collisions.
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Table A.4 – Continued from previous page
Data Element
802.3x Pause Frames Transmitted

Stat Description
A count of MAC Control frames transmitted
on this interface with an opcode indicating
the PAUSE operation. This counter does not
increment when the interface is operating in
half–duplex mode.

GVRP PDUs Received

The count of GVRP PDUs received in the
GARP layer.

GVRP PDUs Transmitted

The count of GVRP PDUs transmitted from
the GARP layer.

GVRP Failed Registrations

The number of times attempted GVRP registrations could not be completed.

GMRP PDUs Received

The count of GMRP PDUs received in the
GARP layer.

GMRP PDUs Transmitted

The count of GMRP PDUs transmitted from
the GARP layer.

GMRP Failed Registrations

The number of times attempted GMRP registrations could not be completed.

STP BPDUs Transmitted

Spanning Tree Protocol Bridge Protocol
Data Units sent.

STP BPDUs Received

Spanning Tree Protocol Bridge Protocol
Data Units received.

RST BPDUs Transmitted

Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol Bridge Protocol Data Units sent.

RSTP BPDUs Received

Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol Bridge Protocol Data Units received.
Continued on next page
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Table A.4 – Continued from previous page
Data Element
MSTP BPDUs Transmitted

Stat Description
Multiple Spanning Tree Protocol Bridge Protocol Data Units sent.

MSTP BPDUs Received

Multiple Spanning Tree Protocol Bridge Protocol Data Units received

EAPOL Frames Transmitted

The number of EAPOL frames of any type
that have been transmitted by this authenticator.

EAPOL Frames Received

The number of valid EAPOL frames of any
type that have been received by this authenticator.

Time Since Counters Last Cleared

Time since the switch counters were last
cleared

Rx packets

Number of Packets Received by an interface

Rx errors

Number of received errored packets received
by an interface

Rx drops

Number of received packets dropped by an
interface

Rx overruns

When the receive buffer gets full and has to
drop packets at an interface

Rx frame

When a received packets has an FCS error at
an interface

Tx packets

Number of packets transmitted by an interface

Tx errors

Number of packets that were to be transmitted that have an error at an interface
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Table A.4 – Continued from previous page
Data Element

Stat Description

Tx drops

Number of packets that were to be transmitted are dropped at an interface

Tx overruns

Packets that are dropped due to a full transmit buffer at an interface

Tx carrier

Collisions of transmitted packets from an interface

A.3

Layer 3 Statistics Tables
Table A.5: Layer 3 Statistics Description
Data Element

Vantage Point Collection Method

IpInReceives

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IpInHdrErrors

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IpInAddrErrors

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IpForwDatagrams

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IpInUnknownProtos

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IpInDiscards

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IpInDelivers

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IpOutRequests

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IpOutDiscards

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IpOutNoRoutes

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IpReasmTimeout

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IpReasmReqds

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IpReasmOKs

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP
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Table A.5 – Continued from previous page
Data Element

Vantage Point Collection Method

IpReasmFails

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IpFragOKs

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IpFragFails

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IpFragCreates

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IpRoutingDiscards

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IpInReceives

Linux Host

nstat

IpInHdrErrors

Linux Host

nstat

IpInAddrErrors

Linux Host

nstat

IpForwDatagrams

Linux Host

nstat

IpInUnknownProtos

Linux Host

nstat

IpInDiscards

Linux Host

nstat

IpInDelivers

Linux Host

nstat

IpOutRequests

Linux Host

nstat

IpOutDiscards

Linux Host

nstat

IpOutNoRoutes

Linux Host

nstat

IpReasmTimeout

Linux Host

nstat

IpReasmReqds

Linux Host

nstat

IpReasmOKs

Linux Host

nstat

IpReasmFails

Linux Host

nstat

IpFragOKs

Linux Host

nstat

IpFragFails

Linux Host

nstat

IpFragCreates

Linux Host

nstat

Ip6InReceives

Linux Host

nstat

Ip6InHdrErrors

Linux Host

nstat

Ip6InTooBigErrors

Linux Host

nstat
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Table A.5 – Continued from previous page
Data Element

Vantage Point Collection Method

Ip6InNoRoutes

Linux Host

nstat

Ip6InAddrErrors

Linux Host

nstat

Ip6InUnknownProtos

Linux Host

nstat

Ip6InTruncatedPkts

Linux Host

nstat

Ip6InDiscards

Linux Host

nstat

Ip6InDelivers

Linux Host

nstat

Ip6OutForwDatagrams

Linux Host

nstat

Ip6OutRequests

Linux Host

nstat

Ip6OutDiscards

Linux Host

nstat

Ip6OutNoRoutes

Linux Host

nstat

Ip6ReasmTimeout

Linux Host

nstat

Ip6ReasmReqds

Linux Host

nstat

Ip6ReasmOKs

Linux Host

nstat

Ip6ReasmFails

Linux Host

nstat

Ip6FragOKs

Linux Host

nstat

Ip6FragFails

Linux Host

nstat

Ip6FragCreates

Linux Host

nstat

Ip6InMcastPkts

Linux Host

nstat

Ip6OutMcastPkts

Linux Host

nstat

Ip6InOctets

Linux Host

nstat

Ip6OutOctets

Linux Host

nstat

Ip6InMcastOctets

Linux Host

nstat

Ip6OutMcastOctets

Linux Host

nstat

Ip6InBcastOctets

Linux Host

nstat

Ip6OutBcastOctets

Linux Host

nstat
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Table A.5 – Continued from previous page
Data Element

Vantage Point Collection Method

Ip6InNoECTPkts

Linux Host

nstat

Ip6InECT1Pkts

Linux Host

nstat

Ip6InECT0Pkts

Linux Host

nstat

Ip6InCEPkts

Linux Host

nstat

IpExtInNoRoutes

Linux Host

nstat

IpExtInTruncatedPkts

Linux Host

nstat

IpExtInMcastPkts

Linux Host

nstat

IpExtOutMcastPkts

Linux Host

nstat

IpExtInBcastPkts

Linux Host

nstat

IpExtOutBcastPkts

Linux Host

nstat

IpExtInOctets

Linux Host

nstat

IpExtOutOctets

Linux Host

nstat

IpExtInMcastOctets

Linux Host

nstat

IpExtOutMcastOctets

Linux Host

nstat

IpExtInBcastOctets

Linux Host

nstat

IpExtOutBcastOctets

Linux Host

nstat

IpExtInCsumErrors

Linux Host

nstat

IpExtInNoECTPkts

Linux Host

nstat

IpExtInECT1Pkts

Linux Host

nstat

IpExtInECT0Pkts

Linux Host

nstat

IpExtInCEPkts

Linux Host

nstat
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Table A.6: Layer 3 Statistics Description
Data Element

Stat Description

IpInReceives

IP packets received

IpInHdrErrors

IP packets received with header errors

IpInAddrErrors

IP packets received with an invalid address

IpForwDatagrams

Datagrams

that

have

been

forwarded

through the switch
IpInUnknownProtos

IP packets received with an unknown or unsupported protocol

IpInDiscards

IP packets that have been discarded due to
a full buffer

IpInDelivers

IP packets delivered to IP user-protocols
such as ICMP

IpOutRequests

IP packets supplied by local IP-user protocols

IpOutDiscards

IP packets discarded due to a full buffer

IpOutNoRoutes

Packets discarded due to having no path on
record to the destination

IpReasmTimeout

Fragmented packets that did not reassemble
in time

IpReasmReqds

Fragmented packets that need to be reassembled at this interface

IpReasmOKs

Fragmented packets that have been reassembled

IpReasmFails

Fragmented packets that could not be reassembled
Continued on next page
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Table A.6 – Continued from previous page
Data Element
IpFragOKs

Stat Description
Packets that have been successfully fragmented

IpFragFails

Packets that were not able to be fragmented

IpFragCreates

Number of fragments that have been created

IpRoutingDiscards

Routing entries that were discarded even if
they were valid

IpInReceives

IP packets received

IpInHdrErrors

IP packets received with header errors

IpInAddrErrors

IP packets received with an invalid address

IpForwDatagrams

Datagrams

that

have

been

forwarded

through this host
IpInUnknownProtos

IP packets received with an unknown or unsupported protocol

IpInDiscards

IP packets that have been discarded due to
a full buffer

IpInDelivers

IP packets delivered to IP user-protocols
such as ICMP

IpOutRequests

IP packets supplied by local IP-user protocols

IpOutDiscards

IP packets discarded due to a full buffer

IpOutNoRoutes

Packets discarded due to having no path on
record to the destination

IpReasmTimeout

Fragmented packets that did not reassemble
in time
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Table A.6 – Continued from previous page
Data Element

Stat Description

IpReasmReqds

Fragmented packets that need to be reassembled at this interface

IpReasmOKs

Fragmented packets that have been reassembled

IpReasmFails

Fragmented packets that could not be reassembled

IpFragOKs

Packets that have been successfully fragmented

IpFragFails

Packets that were not able to be fragmented

IpFragCreates

Number of fragments that have been created

Ip6InReceives

IPv6 packets received

Ip6InHdrErrors
Ip6InTooBigErrors

IPv6 packets received with header errors
Packets dropped due to size being greater
than the MTU

Ip6InNoRoutes

IPv6 packets discarded due to having no path
on record to the destination

Ip6InAddrErrors

IPv6 packets received with an invalid address

Ip6InUnknownProtos

IPv6 packets received with an unknown or
unsupported protocol

Ip6InTruncatedPkts
Ip6InDiscards

IPv6 packets that have been truncated
IPv6 packets that have been discarded due
to a full buffer

Ip6InDelivers

IPv6 packets delivered to IP user-protocols
such as ICMP
Continued on next page
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Table A.6 – Continued from previous page
Data Element

Stat Description

Ip6OutForwDatagrams IPv6 datagrams that have been forwarded
through this host
Ip6OutRequests

IPv6 packets supplied by local IP-user protocols

Ip6OutDiscards

IPv6 packets discarded due to a full buffer

Ip6OutNoRoutes

IPv6 packets discarded due to having no path
on record to the destination

Ip6ReasmTimeout

Fragmented IPv6 packets that did not reassemble in time

Ip6ReasmReqds

Fragmented IPv6 packets that need to be reassembled at this interface

Ip6ReasmOKs

Fragmented IPv6 packets that have been reassembled

Ip6ReasmFails

Fragmented IPv6 packets that could not be
reassembled

Ip6FragOKs

IPv6 packets that have been successfully
fragmented

Ip6FragFails

IPv6 packets that were not able to be fragmented

Ip6FragCreates

Number of IPv6 fragments that have been
created

Ip6InMcastPkts
Ip6OutMcastPkts
Ip6InOctets
Ip6OutOctets

Multicast packets received
Multicast packets sent
Bytes received by IPv6 address
Bytes sent by IPv6 address
Continued on next page
89

Table A.6 – Continued from previous page
Data Element
Ip6InMcastOctets
Ip6OutMcastOctets
Ip6InBcastOctets
Ip6OutBcastOctets
Ip6InNoECTPkts

Stat Description
Multicast bytes received
Multicast bytes sent
Broadcast bytes received
Broadcast bytes sent
Packets received with no congestion notification

Ip6InECT1Pkts

Packets received with a congestion notification of 1

Ip6InECT0Pkts

Packets received with a congestion notification of 0

Ip6InCEPkts
IpExtInNoRoutes

Packets received with congestion experienced
Packets received with no valid route

IpExtInTruncatedPkts Received truncated packets
IpExtInMcastPkts
IpExtOutMcastPkts
IpExtInBcastPkts
IpExtOutBcastPkts
IpExtInOctets
IpExtOutOctets
IpExtInMcastOctets

Received multicast packets
Sent multicast packets
Received broadcast packets
Sent broadcast packets
Bytes received in IP packets
Bytes sent in IP packets
Bytes received from multicast packets

IpExtOutMcastOctets Bytes sent from multicast packets
IpExtInBcastOctets

Bytes received from broadcast packets

IpExtOutBcastOctets Bytes sent from broadcast packets
IpExtInCsumErrors

Packets received with a bad checksum
Continued on next page
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Table A.6 – Continued from previous page
Data Element
IpExtInNoECTPkts

Stat Description
Packets received with no congestion notification

IpExtInECT1Pkts

Packets received with a congestion notification of 1

IpExtInECT0Pkts

Packets received with a congestion notification of 0

IpExtInCEPkts

A.4

Packets received with congestion experienced

Layer 4 Statistics Tables
Table A.7: Layer 4 Statistics Description
Data Element

Vantage Point

Collection Method

IcmpInMsgs

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IcmpInErrors

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IcmpInDestUnreachs

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IcmpInTimeExcds

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IcmpInParmProbs

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IcmpInSrcQuenchs

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IcmpInRedirects

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IcmpInEchos

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IcmpInEchoReps

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IcmpInTimestamps

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IcmpInTimestampReps

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IcmpInAddrMasks

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP
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Table A.7 – Continued from previous page
Data Element

Vantage Point

Collection Method

IcmpInAddrMaskReps

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IcmpOutMsgs

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IcmpOutErrors

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IcmpOutDestUnreachs

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IcmpOutTimeExcds

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IcmpOutParmProbs

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IcmpOutSrcQuenchs

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IcmpOutRedirects

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IcmpOutEchos

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IcmpOutEchoReps

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IcmpOutTimestamps

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IcmpOutTimestampReps

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IcmpOutAddrMasks

Switch

SSH, Possibly SNMP

IcmpInMsgs

Linux Host

nstat

IcmpInErrors

Linux Host

nstat

IcmpInCsumErrors

Linux Host

nstat

IcmpInDestUnreachs

Linux Host

nstat

IcmpInTimeExcds

Linux Host

nstat

IcmpInParmProbs

Linux Host

nstat

IcmpInSrcQuenchs

Linux Host

nstat

IcmpInRedirects

Linux Host

nstat

IcmpInEchos

Linux Host

nstat

IcmpInEchoReps

Linux Host

nstat

IcmpInTimestamps

Linux Host

nstat

IcmpInTimestampReps

Linux Host

nstat
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Table A.7 – Continued from previous page
Data Element

Vantage Point

Collection Method

IcmpInAddrMasks

Linux Host

nstat

IcmpInAddrMaskReps

Linux Host

nstat

IcmpOutMsgs

Linux Host

nstat

IcmpOutErrors

Linux Host

nstat

IcmpOutDestUnreachs

Linux Host

nstat

IcmpOutTimeExcds

Linux Host

nstat

IcmpOutParmProbs

Linux Host

nstat

IcmpOutSrcQuenchs

Linux Host

nstat

IcmpOutRedirects

Linux Host

nstat

IcmpOutEchos

Linux Host

nstat

IcmpOutEchoReps

Linux Host

nstat

IcmpOutTimestamps

Linux Host

nstat

IcmpOutTimestampReps

Linux Host

nstat

IcmpOutAddrMasks

Linux Host

nstat

IcmpOutAddrMaskReps

Linux Host

nstat

IcmpMsgInType3

Linux Host

nstat

IcmpMsgInType11

Linux Host

nstat

IcmpMsgOutType3

Linux Host

nstat

IcmpMsgOutType11

Linux Host

nstat

TcpActiveOpens

Linux Host

nstat

TcpPassiveOpens

Linux Host

nstat

TcpAttemptFails

Linux Host

nstat

TcpEstabResets

Linux Host

nstat

TcpInSegs

Linux Host

nstat

TcpOutSegs

Linux Host

nstat
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Table A.7 – Continued from previous page
Data Element

Vantage Point

Collection Method

TcpRetransSegs

Linux Host

nstat

TcpInErrs

Linux Host

nstat

TcpOutRsts

Linux Host

nstat

TcpInCsumErrors

Linux Host

nstat

UdpInDatagrams

Linux Host

nstat

UdpNoPorts

Linux Host

nstat

UdpInErrors

Linux Host

nstat

UdpOutDatagrams

Linux Host

nstat

UdpRcvbufErrors

Linux Host

nstat

UdpSndbufErrors

Linux Host

nstat

UdpInCsumErrors

Linux Host

nstat

UdpIgnoredMulti

Linux Host

nstat

UdpLiteInDatagrams

Linux Host

nstat

UdpLiteNoPorts

Linux Host

nstat

UdpLiteInErrors

Linux Host

nstat

UdpLiteOutDatagrams

Linux Host

nstat

UdpLiteRcvbufErrors

Linux Host

nstat

UdpLiteSndbufErrors

Linux Host

nstat

UdpLiteInCsumErrors

Linux Host

nstat

UdpLiteIgnoredMulti

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6InMsgs

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6InErrors

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6OutMsgs

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6OutErrors

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6InCsumErrors

Linux Host

nstat
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Table A.7 – Continued from previous page
Data Element

Vantage Point

Collection Method

Icmp6InDestUnreachs

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6InPktTooBigs

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6InTimeExcds

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6InParmProblems

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6InEchos

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6InEchoReplies

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6InGroupMembQueries

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6InGroupMembResponses

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6InGroupMembReductions

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6InRouterSolicits

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6InRouterAdvertisements

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6InNeighborSolicits

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6InNeighborAdvertisements

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6InRedirects

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6InMLDv2Reports

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6OutDestUnreachs

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6OutPktTooBigs

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6OutTimeExcds

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6OutParmProblems

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6OutEchos

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6OutEchoReplies

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6OutGroupMembQueries

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6OutGroupMembResponses

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6OutGroupMembReductions

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6OutRouterSolicits

Linux Host

nstat
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Table A.7 – Continued from previous page
Data Element

Vantage Point

Collection Method

Icmp6OutRouterAdvertisements

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6OutNeighborSolicits

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6OutNeighborAdvertisements

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6OutRedirects

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6OutMLDv2Reports

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6InType134

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6InType143

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6OutType133

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6OutType135

Linux Host

nstat

Icmp6OutType143

Linux Host

nstat

Udp6InDatagrams

Linux Host

nstat

Udp6NoPorts

Linux Host

nstat

Udp6InErrors

Linux Host

nstat

Udp6OutDatagrams

Linux Host

nstat

Udp6RcvbufErrors

Linux Host

nstat

Udp6SndbufErrors

Linux Host

nstat

Udp6InCsumErrors

Linux Host

nstat

Udp6IgnoredMulti

Linux Host

nstat

UdpLite6InDatagrams

Linux Host

nstat

UdpLite6NoPorts

Linux Host

nstat

UdpLite6InErrors

Linux Host

nstat

UdpLite6OutDatagrams

Linux Host

nstat

UdpLite6RcvbufErrors

Linux Host

nstat

UdpLite6SndbufErrors

Linux Host

nstat

UdpLite6InCsumErrors

Linux Host

nstat

Continued on next page
96

Table A.7 – Continued from previous page
Data Element

Vantage Point

Collection Method

TcpExtSyncookiesSent

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtSyncookiesRecv

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtSyncookiesFailed

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtEmbryonicRsts

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtPruneCalled

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtRcvPruned

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtOfoPruned

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtOutOfWindowIcmps

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtLockDroppedIcmps

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtArpFilter

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTW

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTWRecycled

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTWKilled

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtPAWSActive

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtPAWSEstab

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtDelayedACKs

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtDelayedACKLocked

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtDelayedACKLost

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtListenOverflows

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtListenDrops

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPHPHits

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPPureAcks

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPHPAcks

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPRenoRecovery

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPSackRecovery

Linux Host

nstat
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Data Element

Vantage Point

Collection Method

TcpExtTCPSACKReneging

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPSACKReorder

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPRenoReorder

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPTSReorder

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPFullUndo

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPPartialUndo

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPDSACKUndo

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPLossUndo

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPLostRetransmit

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPRenoFailures

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPSackFailures

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPLossFailures

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPFastRetrans

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPSlowStartRetrans

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPTimeouts

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPLossProbes

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPLossProbeRecovery

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPRenoRecoveryFail

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPSackRecoveryFail

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPRcvCollapsed

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPDSACKOldSent

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPDSACKOfoSent

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPDSACKRecv

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPDSACKOfoRecv

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPAbortOnData

Linux Host

nstat
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Table A.7 – Continued from previous page
Data Element

Vantage Point

Collection Method

TcpExtTCPAbortOnClose

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPAbortOnMemory

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPAbortOnTimeout

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPAbortOnLinger

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPAbortFailed

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPMemoryPressures

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPMemoryPressuresChrono

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPSACKDiscard

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPDSACKIgnoredOld

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPDSACKIgnoredNoUndo

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPSpuriousRTOs

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPMD5NotFound

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPMD5Unexpected

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPMD5Failure

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPSackShifted

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPSackMerged

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPSackShiftFallback

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPBacklogDrop

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtPFMemallocDrop

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPMinTTLDrop

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPDeferAcceptDrop

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtIPReversePathFilter

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPTimeWaitOverflow

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPReqQFullDoCookies

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPReqQFullDrop

Linux Host

nstat
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Table A.7 – Continued from previous page
Data Element

Vantage Point

Collection Method

TcpExtTCPRetransFail

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPRcvCoalesce

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPOFOQueue

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPOFODrop

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPOFOMerge

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPChallengeACK

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPSYNChallenge

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPFastOpenActive

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPFastOpenActiveFail

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPFastOpenPassive

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPFastOpenPassiveFail

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPFastOpenListenOverflow

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPFastOpenCookieReqd

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPFastOpenBlackhole

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPSpuriousRtxHostQueues

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtBusyPollRxPackets

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPAutoCorking

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPFromZeroWindowAdv

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPToZeroWindowAdv

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPWantZeroWindowAdv

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPSynRetrans

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPOrigDataSent

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPHystartTrainDetect

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPHystartTrainCwnd

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPHystartDelayDetect

Linux Host

nstat
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Table A.7 – Continued from previous page
Data Element

Vantage Point

Collection Method

TcpExtTCPHystartDelayCwnd

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPACKSkippedSynRecv

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPACKSkippedPAWS

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPACKSkippedSeq

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPACKSkippedFinWait2

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPACKSkippedTimeWait

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPACKSkippedChallenge

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPWinProbe

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPKeepAlive

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPMTUPFail

Linux Host

nstat

TcpExtTCPMTUPSuccess

Linux Host

nstat

Netflow Records

Linux Host, Switch, etc.

Various

Table A.8: Layer 4 Statistics Description
Data Element

Stat Description

IcmpInMsgs

ICMP packets received

IcmpInErrors

ICMP packets with errors

IcmpInDestUnreachs

ICMP packets with no route to destination

IcmpInTimeExcds

TTL exceeded messages received

IcmpInParmProbs

Bad IP headers

IcmpInSrcQuenchs

Packet lost messages slow down

IcmpInRedirects

Error message to use a new route to same
destination

IcmpInEchos

Echos of ICMP messages received
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Table A.8 – Continued from previous page
Data Element

Stat Description

IcmpInEchoReps

ICMP echo replies

IcmpInTimestamps
IcmpInTimestampReps

ICMP timestamp request
Timestamp replies

IcmpInAddrMasks

Address mask request

IcmpInAddrMaskReps

Address mask replies

IcmpOutMsgs

ICMP packets sent

IcmpOutErrors

ICMP packets sent with errors

IcmpOutDestUnreachs

ICMP packets with no route to destination

IcmpOutTimeExcds

Packets sent that expire (TTL = 0)

IcmpOutParmProbs

Bad IP headers

IcmpOutSrcQuenchs

Packet lost messages slow down sent

IcmpOutRedirects

Error message to use a new route to same
destination sent

IcmpOutEchos
IcmpOutEchoReps
IcmpOutTimestamps
IcmpOutTimestampReps
IcmpOutAddrMasks

Echos sent
Echo replies sent
Timestamp requests sent
Timestamp replies sent
Address mask requests sent

IcmpInMsgs

ICMP packet received

IcmpInErrors

ICMP packets received with errors

IcmpInCsumErrors
IcmpInDestUnreachs

Packets with bad checksums
ICMP packets with no route to destination

IcmpInTimeExcds

TTL exceeded messages received

IcmpInParmProbs

Bad IP headers

IcmpInSrcQuenchs

Packet lost messages slow down
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Table A.8 – Continued from previous page
Data Element

Stat Description

IcmpInRedirects

Error message to use a new route to same
destination

IcmpInEchos
IcmpInEchoReps
IcmpInTimestamps
IcmpInTimestampReps

Echos of ICMP messages received
ICMP echo replies
ICMP timestamp request
Timestamp replies

IcmpInAddrMasks

Address mask request

IcmpInAddrMaskReps

Address mask replies

IcmpOutMsgs

ICMP packets sent

IcmpOutErrors

ICMP packets sent with errors

IcmpOutDestUnreachs

ICMP packets with no route to destination

IcmpOutTimeExcds

Packets sent that expire (TTL = 0)

IcmpOutParmProbs

Bad IP headers

IcmpOutSrcQuenchs

Packet lost messages slow down sent

IcmpOutRedirects

Error message to use a new route to same
destination sent

IcmpOutEchos
IcmpOutEchoReps
IcmpOutTimestamps
IcmpOutTimestampReps
IcmpOutAddrMasks
IcmpOutAddrMaskReps

Echos sent
Echo replies sent
Timestamp requests sent
Timestamp replies sent
Address mask requests sent
Address mask replies sent

IcmpMsgInType3

Destination unreachable

IcmpMsgInType11

Time exceeded

IcmpMsgOutType3

Destination unreachable
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Table A.8 – Continued from previous page
Data Element
IcmpMsgOutType11
TcpActiveOpens

Stat Description
Time exceeded
The number of times that TCP connections
have made a direct transition to the SYNSENT state from the CLOSED state

TcpPassiveOpens

The number of times TCP connections have
made a direct transition to the SYN-RCVD
state from the LISTEN state

TcpAttemptFails

The number of times that TCP connections have made a direct transition to the
CLOSED state from either the SYN-SENT
state or the SYN-RCVD state, plus the number of times that TCP connections have
made a direct transition to the LISTEN state
from the SYN-RCVD state

TcpEstabResets

The number of times that TCP connections have made a direct transition to the
CLOSED state from either the ESTABLISHED state or the CLOSE-WAIT state

TcpInSegs
TcpOutSegs
TcpRetransSegs

TCP segments received
TCP segments sent
TCP retransmitted segments

TcpInErrs

TCP segments received with errors

TcpOutRsts

TCP segments sent with reset flag

TcpInCsumErrors

TCP segments received with bad checksums

UdpInDatagrams

UDP datagrams received
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Table A.8 – Continued from previous page
Data Element
UdpNoPorts

Stat Description
The total number of received UDP datagrams for which there was no application at
the destination port

UdpInErrors
UdpOutDatagrams

UDP datagrams received with errors
UDP datagrams sent

UdpRcvbufErrors

UDP receive buffer errors

UdpSndbufErrors

UDP send buffer errors

UdpInCsumErrors

UDP datagrams received with bad checksum

UdpIgnoredMulti

UDP ignored multicasts

UdpLiteInDatagrams
UdpLiteNoPorts

UDP lite datagrams received
The total number of received UDP lite datagrams for which there was no application at
the destination port

UdpLiteInErrors
UdpLiteOutDatagrams

UDP lite datagrams received with errors
UDP lite datagrams sent

UdpLiteRcvbufErrors

UDP lite receive buffer errors

UdpLiteSndbufErrors

UDP lite send buffer errors

UdpLiteInCsumErrors

UDP lite datagrams received with bad checksum

UdpLiteIgnoredMulti

UDP lite ignored multicasts

Icmp6InMsgs

ICMP packets received using IPv6

Icmp6InErrors

ICMP packets received with error using IPv6

Icmp6OutMsgs

ICMP packets sent using IPv6

Icmp6OutErrors

ICMP packets sent with errors using IPv6
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Table A.8 – Continued from previous page
Data Element
Icmp6InCsumErrors

Stat Description
ICMP packets received with bad checksums
using IPv6

Icmp6InDestUnreachs

ICMP destination unreachable messages received using IPv6

Icmp6InPktTooBigs

ICMP packet too big messages received using
IPv6

Icmp6InTimeExcds

ICMP packet timeout messages received using IPv6

Icmp6InParmProblems

ICMP packets with bad IP headers using
IPv6

Icmp6InEchos
Icmp6InEchoReplies
Icmp6InGroupMembQueries

ICMP echo received using IPv6
ICMP echo replies received using IPv6
ICMP group member queries received using
IPv6

Icmp6InGroupMembResponses

ICMP group member query responses received using IPv6

Icmp6InGroupMembReductions

ICMP group reduction messages received using IPv6

Icmp6InRouterSolicits

ICMP router solicitation messages received
using IPv6

Icmp6InRouterAdvertisements

ICMP router advertisement messages received using IPv6

Icmp6InNeighborSolicits

ICMP messages received sent to locate
routers using IPv6
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Table A.8 – Continued from previous page
Data Element
Icmp6InNeighborAdvertisements

Stat Description
ICMP messages received from routers to advertise existence using IPv6

Icmp6InRedirects

ICMP messages received sent to reroute more
efficiently

Icmp6InMLDv2Reports

Multicast Listener Discovery reports

Icmp6OutDestUnreachs

ICMP destination unreachable messages sent
using IPv6

Icmp6OutPktTooBigs

ICMP packet too big messages sent using
IPv6

Icmp6OutTimeExcds

ICMP packet timeout messages sent using
IPv6

Icmp6OutParmProblems

ICMP packets with bad IP headers using
IPv6

Icmp6OutEchos
Icmp6OutEchoReplies

ICMP echo sent using IPv6
ICMP echo replies sent using IPv6

Icmp6OutGroupMembQueries

ICMP group member queries sent using IPv6

Icmp6OutGroupMembResponses

ICMP group member query responses sent
using IPv6

Icmp6OutGroupMembReductions

ICMP group reduction messages sent using
IPv6

Icmp6OutRouterSolicits

ICMP router solicitation messages sent using
IPv6

Icmp6OutRouterAdvertisements

ICMP router advertisement messages sent
using IPv6
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Table A.8 – Continued from previous page
Data Element
Icmp6OutNeighborSolicits

Stat Description
ICMP messages sent to locate routers using
IPv6

Icmp6OutNeighborAdvertisements

ICMP messages sent to neighbors to advertise existence

Icmp6OutRedirects

ICMP messages sent to reroute more efficiently

Icmp6OutMLDv2Reports

Multicast Listener Discovery reports sent

Icmp6InType134

Router advertisements messages received

Icmp6InType143

Multicast listener reports received

Icmp6OutType133

Router solicitation messages sent

Icmp6OutType135

Neighbor solicitation messages sent

Icmp6OutType143

Multicast listener reports sent

Udp6InDatagrams

UDP datagrams received using IPv6

Udp6NoPorts

The total number of received UDP datagrams for which there was no application at
the destination port using IPv6

Udp6InErrors

UDP datagrams received with errors using
IPv6

Udp6OutDatagrams

UDP datagrams sent using IPv6

Udp6RcvbufErrors

UDP receive buffer errors using IPv6

Udp6SndbufErrors

UDP send buffer errors using IPv6

Udp6InCsumErrors

UDP datagrams received with bad checksum
using IPv6

Udp6IgnoredMulti
UdpLite6InDatagrams

UDP ignored multicasts using IPv6
UDP lite datagrams received using IPv6
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Table A.8 – Continued from previous page
Data Element
UdpLite6NoPorts

Stat Description
The total number of received UDP lite datagrams for which there was no application at
the destination port using IPv6

UdpLite6InErrors

UDP lite datagrams received with errors using IPv6

UdpLite6OutDatagrams

UDP lite datagrams sent using IPv6

UdpLite6RcvbufErrors

UDP lite receive buffer errors using IPv6

UdpLite6SndbufErrors

UDP lite send buffer errors using IPv6

UdpLite6InCsumErrors

UDP lite datagrams received with bad checksum using IPv6

TcpExtSyncookiesSent

TCP SYN cookies sent

TcpExtSyncookiesRecv

TCP SYN cookies received

TcpExtSyncookiesFailed

Bad TCP SYN cookies

TcpExtEmbryonicRsts

TCP connection that has not finished handshake process reset

TcpExtPruneCalled

TCP pruning process has been called

TcpExtRcvPruned

TCP packets received that have been pruned

TcpExtOfoPruned

Out of order TCP packets that have been
pruned

TcpExtOutOfWindowIcmps

ICMP request that are out of appropriate
window

TcpExtLockDroppedIcmps

ICMP messages that have been locked and
dropped

TcpExtArpFilter
TcpExtTW

ARP messages that have been filtered
Time waits initialized
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Table A.8 – Continued from previous page
Data Element

Stat Description

TcpExtTWRecycled

Time waits recycled

TcpExtTWKilled

Time waits stopped

TcpExtPAWSActive

TCP Protection Against Wrapping Sequence
active connections

TcpExtPAWSEstab

TCP Protection Against Wrapping Sequence
established connections

TcpExtDelayedACKs
TcpExtDelayedACKLocked
TcpExtDelayedACKLost
TcpExtListenOverflows

Delayed acknowledgments received
Delayed acknowledgments locked
Delayed acknowledgments lost
Overflow of listening sockets

TcpExtListenDrops

Dropped listening sockets

TcpExtTCPHPHits

TCP HP Hits

TcpExtTCPPureAcks
TcpExtTCPHPAcks

Acknowledgments with no data
HP Acknowledgments

TcpExtTCPRenoRecovery

TCP Reno recovery invoked

TcpExtTCPSackRecovery

Selective acknowledgment recovery

TcpExtTCPSACKReneging

Selective acknowledgment that is later discarded

TcpExtTCPSACKReorder

Selective acknowledgment segment reordering

TcpExtTCPRenoReorder
TcpExtTCPTSReorder
TcpExtTCPFullUndo

TCP Reno segments reordered
TCP timestamp reordering
TCP complete undo

TcpExtTCPPartialUndo

TCP partial undo

TcpExtTCPDSACKUndo

TCP selective acknowledgment undo
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Table A.8 – Continued from previous page
Data Element
TcpExtTCPLossUndo
TcpExtTCPLostRetransmit

Stat Description
TCP loss undo
TCP lost retransmissions

TcpExtTCPRenoFailures

TCP Reno segment failures

TcpExtTCPSackFailures

TCP selective acknowledgment failures

TcpExtTCPLossFailures

TCP loss failures

TcpExtTCPFastRetrans

TCP fast retransmissions

TcpExtTCPSlowStartRetrans
TcpExtTCPTimeouts
TcpExtTCPLossProbes

TCP retransmissions sent during slow start
TCP timeouts
TCP loss probes

TcpExtTCPLossProbeRecovery

TCP loss probes recovered

TcpExtTCPRenoRecoveryFail

TCP Reno recovery failed

TcpExtTCPSackRecoveryFail

TCP selective acknowledgment recovery failures

TcpExtTCPRcvCollapsed

TCP packets that have been collapsed

TcpExtTCPDSACKOldSent

Old duplicate selective acknowledgments

TcpExtTCPDSACKOfoSent

Out of order duplicate selective acknowledgments

TcpExtTCPDSACKRecv

Duplicate selective acknowledgments received

TcpExtTCPDSACKOfoRecv

Out of order duplicate selective acknowledgments received

TcpExtTCPAbortOnData

TCP connection abort due to no/bad data

TcpExtTCPAbortOnClose

TCP connection abort due to closed socket

TcpExtTCPAbortOnMemory

TCP connection abort due to no memory

TcpExtTCPAbortOnTimeout

TCP connection abort due to timeout
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Table A.8 – Continued from previous page
Data Element
TcpExtTCPAbortOnLinger

Stat Description
TCP connection abort due to lingering connection

TcpExtTCPAbortFailed
TcpExtTCPMemoryPressures

TCP connection aborts failed
TCP memory pressure flags raised

TcpExtTCPMemoryPressuresChrono TCP memory pressure flags chrono
TcpExtTCPSACKDiscard
TcpExtTCPDSACKIgnoredOld

TCP selective acknowledgment discards
TCP duplicate selective acknowledgments ignored

TcpExtTCPDSACKIgnoredNoUndo TCP duplicate selective acknowledgments ignored that haven’t been undone
TcpExtTCPSpuriousRTOs

TCP retransmission timeouts

TcpExtTCPMD5NotFound

MD5 Checksum not found

TcpExtTCPMD5Unexpected

Unexpected MD5 checksum

TcpExtTCPMD5Failure

MD5 checksum failure

TcpExtTCPSackShifted

Selective acknowledgments shifted

TcpExtTCPSackMerged

Selective acknowledgments merged

TcpExtTCPSackShiftFallback

Selective acknowledgment shift fallbacks

TcpExtTCPBacklogDrop

Dropped connections due to TCP backlog

TcpExtPFMemallocDrop

Dropped connections due to memory allocation problems

TcpExtTCPMinTTLDrop
TcpExtTCPDeferAcceptDrop

Minimum time to live connection drops
Connections dropped after deferred acceptation

TcpExtIPReversePathFilter

Packets dropped when they exit a different
interface than they came in on
Continued on next page
112

Table A.8 – Continued from previous page
Data Element

Stat Description

TcpExtTCPTimeWaitOverflow

Time wait overflow

TcpExtTCPReqQFullDoCookies

TCP requested queue cookies

TcpExtTCPReqQFullDrop

TCP requested full queue drop

TcpExtTCPRetransFail

TCP retransmissions failed

TcpExtTCPRcvCoalesce

TCP segments coalesced

TcpExtTCPOFOQueue

TCP out of order queue count

TcpExtTCPOFODrop

TCP out of order drops

TcpExtTCPOFOMerge

TCP out of order merges

TcpExtTCPChallengeACK

TCP challenge acknowledgments

TcpExtTCPSYNChallenge

TCP SYN challenges

TcpExtTCPFastOpenActive

Number of fast open connections that are active

TcpExtTCPFastOpenActiveFail
TcpExtTCPFastOpenPassive

Fast open connections that have failed
Fast open connections that are connected but
passive

TcpExtTCPFastOpenPassiveFail

Passive fast open connections that have
failed

TcpExtTCPFastOpenListenOverflow Fast open connections dropped from too
many connections trying to be made
TcpExtTCPFastOpenCookieReqd
TcpExtTCPFastOpenBlackhole

Fast open connection cookies requested
Perpetual failure of TCP fast open recovery

TcpExtTCPSpuriousRtxHostQueues Spurious host queues
TcpExtBusyPollRxPackets
TcpExtTCPAutoCorking
TcpExtTCPFromZeroWindowAdv

Packets busy polling
Sockets corked automatically
No space left in receive buffer to send
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Table A.8 – Continued from previous page
Data Element
TcpExtTCPToZeroWindowAdv
TcpExtTCPWantZeroWindowAdv
TcpExtTCPSynRetrans
TcpExtTCPOrigDataSent

Stat Description
No space left in receive buffer to receive
Message to fill up receive buffer
TCP SYN retransmissions
Bytes of original TCP data sent

TcpExtTCPHystartTrainDetect

Hystart congestion detection

TcpExtTCPHystartTrainCwnd

Hystart congestion window size update

TcpExtTCPHystartDelayDetect

Delayed Hystart congestion detection

TcpExtTCPHystartDelayCwnd

Delayed Hystart congestion window size update

TcpExtTCPACKSkippedSynRecv
TcpExtTCPACKSkippedPAWS

Skipped SYNs received
Skipped protection against wrapping sequence acknowledgments skipped

TcpExtTCPACKSkippedSeq

Skipped sequence acknowledgments

TcpExtTCPACKSkippedFinWait2

Skipped FIN acknowledgments during wait

TcpExtTCPACKSkippedTimeWait

Skipped time wait acknowledgments

TcpExtTCPACKSkippedChallenge

Skipped challenge acknowledgments

TcpExtTCPWinProbe

Window probes sent

TcpExtTCPKeepAlive

Keep connection alive messages sent

TcpExtTCPMTUPFail

TCP maximum transfer unit packet fails

TcpExtTCPMTUPSuccess

TCP maximum transfer unit packet successes

Netflow Records

IP statistics of flows
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